CVE-2026-75898: infiniflow ragflow · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affects infiniflow ragflowSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.4 High : upgrade to 0.26.3 soon.
Data as of 16 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 33% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.26.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 18 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: evidence found.
Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 16 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade infiniflow ragflow to 0.26.3.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| infiniflowragflow | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubragflowpkg:github/ragflowOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available in RAGFlow version 0.26.3 and later. Users should upgrade to version 0.26.3 or newer to remediate this SSRF vulnerability. Until upgraded, avoid allowing untrusted users to create or trigger agents that use the Invoke component. The vendor advisory or patch links are not provided here; users should consult the official infiniflow resources for the update.
Description
RAGFlow before 0.26.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the agent workflow "Invoke" component (agent/component/invoke.py). The component builds an outbound request URL from canvas configuration and runtime template variables and passes it to requests.get, requests.post, or requests.put without calling the shared assert_url_is_safe validator or pinning the resolved address, unlike the crawler, SearXNG, file-upload, and RSS fetch paths. A user who can create or trigger an agent can direct the server to fetch loopback, link-local, and RFC 1918 destinations, including cloud instance metadata endpoints and services co-located on the deployment network, and the response body is returned as the component output. Where an agent is configured to interpolate the chat query into the Invoke URL, the destination is chosen by whoever can send that query.
References
- github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/releases/tag/v0.26.3 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/issues/15425 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/issues/18280 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/blob/v0.26.2/agent/component/invoke.py (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/commit/e16d1a0150e1ca069beb538ae3dcd03f59edc5fa (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/commit/c4fe68eaa0bf1d6442d2cd6ac2e35bc9ccbed34f (opens in a new tab)
- vulncheck.com/advisories/ragflow-server-side-request-forgery-via-agent-invoke-component (opens in a new tab)