CVE-2026-77972: Slab safeurl · Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Affects Slab safeurlSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.0 Critical.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 26% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 15 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Slabsafeurl | Affected
| Fixed in– |
| Slabsafeurl | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Hexsafeurlpkg:hex/safeurlOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
CPE configurations (1)
cpe:2.3:a:slab:safeurl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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AI-suggested
Users should monitor the vendor's advisory for updates. Until a fix is available, be aware of the risk when using safeurl in environments where DNS responses can be manipulated or where DNS records frequently change. Consider additional network-level controls or DNS security measures to mitigate exploitation risks.
Description
Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in Slab safeurl allows an attacker who controls a hostname's DNS responses to reach internal network destinations that validation rejected. Validation returns a verdict and not the address it approved, so the HTTP clients the library ships receive the original hostname and resolve it a second time when the request is made. An attacker who controls the authoritative DNS for a name can answer the first lookup with a permitted address and the second with a blocked one, and the request then reaches a destination validation never approved. The same window opens without an attacker whenever a name legitimately resolves to different addresses across lookups, such as short record lifetimes or rotation between several addresses. This issue affects safeurl: from 0.1.0 onward.