CVE-2026-7830: uvnc UltraVNC · Inadequate Encryption Strength
Affects uvnc UltraVNCSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.4 High.
Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 23:54 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 21% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 1 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| uvncUltraVNC | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, avoid using the legacy MS-Logon II authentication scheme in UltraVNC. Prefer MS-Logon III authentication, which uses stronger cryptographic algorithms (X25519 and AES-256-GCM) and is not affected by this vulnerability.
Description
UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses inadequate cryptography in the MS-Logon II authentication scheme (rfbUltraVNC_MsLogonIIAuth). In rfb/dh.cpp the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is performed with parameters that fit in an unsigned 64-bit integer (DH_MAX_BITS controls the prime size). A 64-bit DH key can be broken by Pollard's rho algorithm in under one second on current hardware. Additionally, the private exponent is generated by the rng() function, which multiplies three libc rand() values seeded from time(NULL). With approximately 31 bits of internal state and a time-based seed, the private exponent is recoverable in under a minute by a passive observer. A network attacker who can observe the MS-Logon II handshake (via sniffing, recording, or man-in-the-middle) can derive the shared DH key and decrypt the encapsulated username and password, resulting in full credential disclosure. This affects legacy MS-Logon II connections; MS-Logon III (X25519 + AES-256-GCM) is unaffected.