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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-7838: uvnc UltraVNC · Integer Overflow or Wraparound

Affects uvnc UltraVNCSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High.

Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
8.7High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
1.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 79% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 1 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
uvncUltraVNCAffected
  • <=1.8.2.2
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until an official fix is available, users should avoid connecting to untrusted VNC servers and consider network-level protections to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Monitor vendor channels for updates and apply patches promptly once released.

Description

UltraVNC viewer through 1.8.2.2 contains an integer overflow leading to a heap buffer overflow in the RFB protocol failure-response parsing path. In vncviewer/ClientConnection.cpp, the 4-byte network-supplied reasonLen field (type CARD32) is passed as reasonLen+1 to CheckBufferSize(). Because both operands are unsigned 32-bit, a reasonLen of 0xFFFFFFFF overflows to 0, causing CheckBufferSize to allocate only 256 bytes. The subsequent ReadString(m_netbuf, reasonLen) call then performs ReadExact for the original 4 GiB length into that 256-byte heap buffer. This overflow is reachable via rfbConnFailed (auth-scheme negotiation) and rfbVncAuthFailed (post-handshake) message types without successful authentication. A malicious VNC server, or any man-in-the-middle on the RFB stream, can trigger this condition when the victim viewer connects, potentially resulting in remote code execution as the user running the viewer. The crash was confirmed with AddressSanitizer on a portable reproduction harness (heap-buffer-overflow WRITE at offset 256).

References

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