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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-8023: zephyrproject zephyr · Info-leak

Affects zephyrproject zephyrSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 4.6.0 soon.

Data as of 10 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (zephyr)CVSS 3.17.5
EPSS
0.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 59% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.6.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 29 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: evidence found.

    Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade zephyrproject zephyr to 4.6.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
zephyrprojectzephyrAffected
  • >=4.0.0 <4.6.0
Fixed in
  • 4.6.0
GitHubzephyrpkg:github/zephyrOther threatsAffected
  • >=4.0.0 <4.6.0
Fixed in
  • 4.6.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

The vendor has introduced a fix that canonicalizes URL paths to prevent directory traversal. If you cannot patch yet, avoid enabling the static-filesystem resource or restrict access to the HTTP server. Monitor vendor channels for official patches or updates.

Description

Zephyr's HTTP server (subsys/net/lib/http) provides a static-filesystem resource type (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS, available when CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM is enabled) that serves files from a configured root directory. Before this fix, both the HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 front-ends placed the raw, attacker-controlled request path into client->url_buffer (assembled in on_url() for HTTP/1 and copied verbatim from the :path pseudo-header for HTTP/2) without resolving ./.. segments. The static-FS handler then built the on-disk filename by directly concatenating the configured root with that raw URL (snprintk(fname, ..., "%s%s", static_fs_detail->fs_path, client->url_buffer) at http_server_http1.c:603 and http_server_http2.c:490) and opened it with fs_open(fname, FS_O_READ). Because the handler is reached via wildcard/leading-dir (fnmatch FNM_LEADING_DIR) or fallback resource matching, a request such as GET /<prefix>/../../<file> is dispatched to the handler and, after the underlying filesystem (e.g. LittleFS/FAT) resolves the .. segments, escapes the configured web root, letting an unauthenticated remote client read arbitrary readable files on the mounted volume (information disclosure). The HTTP server requires no TLS or authentication to reach this path. The fix adds http_server_remove_dot_segments(), which canonicalizes the path portion of the URL before resource lookup in both protocol handlers, neutralizing the traversal. Affects releases v4.0.0 through v4.4.0 for deployments that register a static-filesystem resource.

References

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