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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-80869: Linux kernel · ntfs: bound the attribute-list entry in ntfs_read_inode_mount()

Source GCVE Database

0

Not known to be exploited.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC

Severity
Unrated

Rated by Threat Radar · CVSS not yet scored by NVD

EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 9% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 4 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: bound the attribute-list entry in ntfs_read_inode_mount() The $MFT attribute-list walk in ntfs_read_inode_mount() validates each entry only with "(u8 *)al_entry + 6 > al_end" and "(u8 *)al_entry + le16_to_cpu(al_entry->length) > al_end", but then reads al_entry->lowest_vcn (an __le64 at offset 8) and al_entry->mft_reference (offset 16) -- fields beyond the 6 bytes proven in range. al_entry->length is attacker-controlled and only required non-zero, so a short entry (e.g. length 8) placed at the tail passes both checks while the lowest_vcn / mft_reference reads fall past al_end. al_end is ni->attr_list + attr_list_size (the on-disk size); the buffer is kvzalloc(round_up(attr_list_size, SECTOR_SIZE)), so the sector rounding usually absorbs the over-read -- but when attr_list_size is a multiple of SECTOR_SIZE there is no slack and a crafted $MFT attribute list produces an out-of-bounds read at mount time. Validate the entry with ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid() (added in patch 1/3) before dereferencing it, matching the bound the other attribute-list walks now use. The validator already requires the length to cover the fixed header, which makes the separate "!al_entry->length" check redundant, so drop it too.

References

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