CVE-2026-80869: Linux kernel · ntfs: bound the attribute-list entry in ntfs_read_inode_mount()
Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC
Rated by Threat Radar · CVSS not yet scored by NVD
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 9% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Exploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 4 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: bound the attribute-list entry in ntfs_read_inode_mount() The $MFT attribute-list walk in ntfs_read_inode_mount() validates each entry only with "(u8 *)al_entry + 6 > al_end" and "(u8 *)al_entry + le16_to_cpu(al_entry->length) > al_end", but then reads al_entry->lowest_vcn (an __le64 at offset 8) and al_entry->mft_reference (offset 16) -- fields beyond the 6 bytes proven in range. al_entry->length is attacker-controlled and only required non-zero, so a short entry (e.g. length 8) placed at the tail passes both checks while the lowest_vcn / mft_reference reads fall past al_end. al_end is ni->attr_list + attr_list_size (the on-disk size); the buffer is kvzalloc(round_up(attr_list_size, SECTOR_SIZE)), so the sector rounding usually absorbs the over-read -- but when attr_list_size is a multiple of SECTOR_SIZE there is no slack and a crafted $MFT attribute list produces an out-of-bounds read at mount time. Validate the entry with ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid() (added in patch 1/3) before dereferencing it, matching the bound the other attribute-list walks now use. The validator already requires the length to cover the fixed header, which makes the separate "!al_entry->length" check redundant, so drop it too.