The Apache Airflow Snowflake provider did not validate the 'account' and 'region' fields before interpolating them into request URLs, such as the SQL API endpoint URL. Maliciously crafted 'account' values containing characters like '/', '?', or '#' can alter the intended domain to a path, query, or fragment, enabling an attacker to control the request host. Since the provider sends requests with an Authorization Bearer token (JWT or OAuth token) derived from connection credentials, an attacker with write-only access to the Snowflake connection configuration can cause a valid token to be sent to an attacker-controlled host and potentially replay it against the genuine Snowflake endpoint. This attack requires no DAG authoring privileges, only the ability to edit the connection. The vulnerability also affects OAuth token-request URLs and Cortex Agent base URLs built from these fields. The issue is resolved in apache-airflow-providers-snowflake version 6.18.0 by rejecting 'account' and 'region' values containing characters other than letters, digits, '.', '_', and '-'.

An attacker with write-only access to Snowflake connection configurations can manipulate the 'account' and 'region' fields to redirect requests containing valid authorization tokens to attacker-controlled hosts. This could lead to unauthorized token exposure and replay attacks against the Snowflake API. The vulnerability does not require DAG authoring privileges and affects environments where connection editing is permitted without full credential access.

Upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-snowflake version 6.18.0 or later, which enforces strict validation on 'account' and 'region' fields to allow only letters, digits, '.', '_', and '-'. This prevents malicious manipulation of request URLs. No other mitigation is required as the fix is official and available.