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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-82391: zephyrproject zephyr · Memory-safety

Affects zephyrproject zephyrSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical : upgrade to 4.5.0 or 4.3.2 as a priority.

Data as of 10 Nov 2026, 22:19 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.1Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (zephyr)CVSS 3.19.1
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.5.0, 4.3.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 10 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade zephyrproject zephyr to 4.5.0 or 4.3.2.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
zephyrprojectzephyrAffected
  • >=4.4.0 <4.5.0
Fixed in
  • 4.5.0
zephyrprojectzephyrAffected
  • >=4.0.0 <4.3.2
Fixed in
  • 4.3.2
GitHubzephyrpkg:github/zephyrOther threatsAffected
  • >=4.0.0 <4.3.2
  • >=4.4.0 <4.5.0
Fixed in
  • 4.3.2
  • 4.5.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

The HTTP/2 front-end of the Zephyr HTTP server aliased connection receive state as a scratch output. In subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c, handle_http2_static_fs_resource() passed &client->data_len as the file_size out-parameter of http_server_find_file(). client->data_len is the count of unprocessed bytes remaining in the fixed-size per-connection receive buffer client->buffer[CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_CLIENT_BUFFER_SIZE] (256 bytes by default), an invariant every frame handler and the socket receive path rely on. Serving any static file therefore replaced that bounded value with the file's on-disk size, and nothing resets it afterwards. The defect is reached by an unauthenticated HTTP/2 GET for any file under the web root, in applications that register a static-filesystem resource (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS) with CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM=y; CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_VERSION_2 is enabled by default and no TLS or credentials are required on this path. Once client->data_len exceeds the buffer size, the frame dispatch loop in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_core.c keeps parsing past the end of the received data, and the peer controls the bytes at client->cursor, so it can choose which fabricated frame the state machine consumes next by appending bytes after its request. The inflated length defeats the only guards on the buffer. parse_http_frame_header() and the per-frame handlers read and skip up to a 24-bit frame length beyond the buffer (out-of-bounds read); the compaction memmove(client->buffer, client->cursor, client->data_len) at the end of request handling copies the file-size number of bytes into the 256-byte buffer, overflowing the rest of struct http_client_ctx — including the current_detail/current_stream pointers, the parser_settings function-pointer table and the inactivity_timer work handler — and the adjacent client contexts in static memory; and the subsequent zsock_recv(client->fd, client->buffer + client->data_len, sizeof(client->buffer) - client->data_len, 0) underflows its size argument, writing attacker-supplied data of attacker-chosen length out of bounds. The impact is remote memory corruption in the server's single address space: at minimum a crash or hang of the device, and plausibly control-data overwrite leading to code execution. The HTTP/1 and HTTP/3 static-filesystem handlers already used a local variable and are unaffected; the fix makes the HTTP/2 handler use a local size_t file_size as well.

References

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