CVE-2026-82429: CWE-367 Time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in Apache Software Foundation Apache Storm Worker Launcher
Description The setuid-root `worker-launcher` binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking the tree with FTS and calling `lchown` and `chmod` on each entry's full pathname while running with an effective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the entry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user. A tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with a symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned `lchown` or `chmod` at an arbitrary file on the host. The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker forces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing. This crosses the boundary that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` and container isolation are intended to enforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat'd rather than on pathnames re-resolved at call time. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with `supervisor.run.worker.as.user`, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The Apache Storm Worker Launcher setuid-root binary performs ownership and permission adjustments on worker directories by walking the directory tree with FTS and calling lchown and chmod on each entry's full pathname. Because these syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, an untrusted topology user can exploit a TOCTOU race condition by replacing intermediate directory components with symbolic links between classification and the privileged operation. This allows redirection of privileged operations to arbitrary files on the host system. The vulnerability violates the isolation intended by supervisor.run.worker.as.user and container isolation. The issue is fixed in Apache Storm 3.1.0 by modifying the privileged walk to operate on file descriptors obtained from stat calls rather than on pathnames re-resolved at call time. The launcher binary must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing Java artifacts alone is insufficient.
Potential Impact
An untrusted tenant running code on a supervisor node can exploit this TOCTOU race condition to redirect privileged ownership and permission changes to arbitrary files on the host. This can lead to unauthorized modification of files outside the intended worker directories, potentially compromising the host system's security boundaries. The vulnerability undermines the isolation mechanisms intended to separate tenant code from host privileges.
Mitigation Recommendations
Upgrade Apache Storm to version 3.1.0 or later, where the vulnerability is fixed by using file descriptors for privileged operations instead of pathnames. After upgrading, rebuild and reinstall the worker-launcher binary; replacing Java artifacts alone is insufficient. Until an upgrade is possible, do not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with supervisor.run.worker.as.user, as the launcher is the boundary being crossed.
CVE-2026-82429: CWE-367 Time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in Apache Software Foundation Apache Storm Worker Launcher
Description
Description The setuid-root `worker-launcher` binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking the tree with FTS and calling `lchown` and `chmod` on each entry's full pathname while running with an effective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the entry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user. A tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with a symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned `lchown` or `chmod` at an arbitrary file on the host. The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker forces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing. This crosses the boundary that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` and container isolation are intended to enforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat'd rather than on pathnames re-resolved at call time. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with `supervisor.run.worker.as.user`, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
CVSS v3.1
Score 7.8high
Affected software
Apache Software Foundation
Apache Storm Worker Launcher
pkg:maven/Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.storm:storm-coreRun on your own infrastructure? Check whether these packages are installed with threat-finder — our free open-source scanner.
Weaknesses
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The Apache Storm Worker Launcher setuid-root binary performs ownership and permission adjustments on worker directories by walking the directory tree with FTS and calling lchown and chmod on each entry's full pathname. Because these syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, an untrusted topology user can exploit a TOCTOU race condition by replacing intermediate directory components with symbolic links between classification and the privileged operation. This allows redirection of privileged operations to arbitrary files on the host system. The vulnerability violates the isolation intended by supervisor.run.worker.as.user and container isolation. The issue is fixed in Apache Storm 3.1.0 by modifying the privileged walk to operate on file descriptors obtained from stat calls rather than on pathnames re-resolved at call time. The launcher binary must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing Java artifacts alone is insufficient.
Potential Impact
An untrusted tenant running code on a supervisor node can exploit this TOCTOU race condition to redirect privileged ownership and permission changes to arbitrary files on the host. This can lead to unauthorized modification of files outside the intended worker directories, potentially compromising the host system's security boundaries. The vulnerability undermines the isolation mechanisms intended to separate tenant code from host privileges.
Mitigation Recommendations
Upgrade Apache Storm to version 3.1.0 or later, where the vulnerability is fixed by using file descriptors for privileged operations instead of pathnames. After upgrading, rebuild and reinstall the worker-launcher binary; replacing Java artifacts alone is insufficient. Until an upgrade is possible, do not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with supervisor.run.worker.as.user, as the launcher is the boundary being crossed.
Technical Details
- Data Version
- 5.2
- Assigner Short Name
- apache
- Date Reserved
- 2026-08-29T10:14:24.656Z
- State
- PUBLISHED
Threat ID: 6aa8057055bf5e2cf52f81be
Added to database: 09/14/2026, 14:32:16 UTC
Last enriched: 09/14/2026, 14:48:19 UTC
Last updated: 09/15/2026, 03:06:59 UTC
Views: 10
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