CVE-2026-89632: Linux kernel · smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr()
Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High · fixed in b70bc592afd19732e2e4563300ebe8f974280365 : patch Linux kernel soon.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 45% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
- Automatable
- Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
- Technical impact
- Limited control over the software or limited information exposure
CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in b70bc592afd19732e2e4563300ebe8f974280365, 711cf71300d7992f450600df8864917d3538679f, 6.6.160 +1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 11 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade Linux kernel to b70bc592afd19732e2e4563300ebe8f974280365, 711cf71300d7992f450600df8864917d3538679f, 6.6.160 or 05f78e6cf34ea3a285053bd5999e08e8ac298bd5.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr() reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf->ReparseDataLength before checking that count covers the full fixed header: buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off); len = sizeof(*buf); /* 8 bytes */ rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf->ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */ if (count < len || count < rdlen + len) /* check comes after */ struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4. If a server returns OutputCount < 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past the end of the received data. The off+count bounds against iov_len were already validated, but that does not protect against count being smaller than sizeof(*buf). Split the check: verify count >= sizeof(*buf) before reading ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region.