CVE-2026-90220: Linux kernel · ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload
Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · fixed in b1e8d40663997aacaa198f37ce6893e07aaba77a : update Linux kernel when convenient.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC
Rated by Threat Radar · CVSS not yet scored by NVD
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 9% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in b1e8d40663997aacaa198f37ce6893e07aaba77a, 59e1592d3c270ff4642d5d6dc55c545306eb0693, 42c3f856d13a91a0d4c302a0c6854813621136db +5
Exploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 17 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload by pointing data.ext.ptr at it. When that event is a queued variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup(). The payload goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address reaches userspace. That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read") removed from the event header. The read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the payload. Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read() treats the header. A stack copy is enough because delivery is synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning. An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE, queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and reading the bounce back. Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/42c3f856d13a91a0d4c302a0c6854813621136db (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1e8d40663997aacaa198f37ce6893e07aaba77a (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e6e471eef1d5d8cb056c7d364023fe048249204 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/59e1592d3c270ff4642d5d6dc55c545306eb0693 (opens in a new tab)