CVE-2026-93603: patriksimek vm2 · Code Injection
Affects patriksimek vm2Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 10.0 Critical : upgrade to 3.12.1 as a priority.
Data as of 2 Nov 2026, 10:58 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 54% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 3.12.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 18 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade patriksimek vm2 to 3.12.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| patriksimekvm2 | Affected
| Fixed in
|
npmvm2pkg:npm/vm2Other threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available in vm2 version 3.12.1. Users of vm2 should upgrade to version 3.12.1 or later to remediate this vulnerability. Until upgrading, avoid exposing non-strict (sloppy-mode) host functions to the sandbox, as strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected. No other mitigations are indicated by the vendor advisory.
Description
vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish `this` receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. `fn()`, a detached method, `fn.call()`, `fn.apply(undefined)`, `Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, [])`, or `fn.bind()()` — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm's global object for `this`. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach `process` and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via `process.getBuiltinModule('child_process').execSync`). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.