CVE-2026-97644: Groundhogg (WordPress plugin) · Improper Privilege Management
Affects Groundhogg (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.8 High.
Data as of 16 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 42% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 3 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 16 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| trainingbusinessprosGroundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, restrict Sales Representative-level access and monitor for suspicious use of the affected REST endpoints. Avoid granting the add_contacts and send_emails capabilities to untrusted users.
Description
The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Contact Identity Rebinding in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 The vulnerability exists because the `create_contact` function in the v3 REST endpoint (`POST /gh/v3/contacts`) is gated solely by the `add_contacts` capability and forwards the full request payload — including the security-bearing `user_id` column — into the upsert path of `Contacts_DB::add()`, which bypasses the ownership guard that `Contacts_DB::update()` enforces, allowing an attacker to rebind any existing contact record to an arbitrary WordPress user ID. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Sales Representative-level access and above to upsert their own contact row to point to an Administrator's user ID, then invoke the v4 email-test endpoint (`POST /gh/v4/emails/test`) — also accessible to the Sales Representative role via the `send_emails` capability — to generate an `{auto_login_url}` one-time permissions key bound to the rebound contact, and consume that link to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` and gain a fully authenticated session as the WordPress Administrator.
References
- wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/557306b7-7b66-465e-8d4d-ebae5b1577c9?source=cve (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/api/v3/contacts-api.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/db/contacts.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/api/v4/emails-api.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/replacements.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/rewrites.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.3/includes/main-roles.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=&new=3724910%40groundhogg%2Ftags%2F4.9.1&old=3724058%40groundhogg%2Ftags%2F4.9 (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3724910/groundhogg/trunk/api/v3/contacts-api.php (opens in a new tab)