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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-98547: Linux kernel · af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()

Affects Linux kernelSource GCVE Database

0

Mentioned vulnerabilities

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-98547· High

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.8 High.

Data as of 28 Oct 2026, 01:28 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
6.8High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinuxpkg:deb/ubuntu/linux?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • 6.17.0-5.5 – 7.0.0-38.38
23 affected builds
Fixed in–
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-awspkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-aws?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • 6.17.0-1002.2 – 7.0.0-1014.14
15 affected builds
Fixed in–
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-azurepkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • 6.17.0-1003.3 – 7.0.0-1017.17
15 affected builds
Fixed in–
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-azure-fdepkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure-fde?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • 7.0.0-1003.3 – 7.0.0-1016.16
9 affected builds
Fixed in–
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-gcppkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-gcp?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • 6.17.0-1002.2 – 7.0.0-1014.14
13 affected builds
Fixed in–
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-gkepkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-gke?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • 7.0.0-1002.3 – 7.0.0-1008.9
6 affected builds
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo() computes in 32-bit int arithmetic: mbits = (blk_size_in_bytes * 8) / (1024 * 1024); If I'm reading the validation right, tp_block_size is user controlled and packet_set_ring() only rejects values that are <= 0 as int or not page aligned, so a 256MiB block goes right through (and alloc_one_pg_vec_page() even has a vzalloc fallback for it). 0x10000000 * 8 wraps to INT_MIN, and on a NIC reporting 1 Gbps (div == 1) the function ends up returning -2047. The condition is actually (8 * size) mod 2^32 >= 2^31 && div == 1, so the trigger set is [256,512), [768,1024), [1280,1536) and [1792,2048) MiB. Other sizes wrap to non-negative values and faster links divide the unsigned value back below 2^31, which is why this doesn't blow up for everyone. What makes it fatal is what happens next in init_prb_bdqc(): p1->interval_ktime = ms_to_ktime(prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(...)); hrtimer_start(&p1->retire_blk_timer, p1->interval_ktime, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT); A negative relative timeout expires immediately. The callback unconditionally returns HRTIMER_RESTART, and hrtimer_forward() turns the negative interval into hrtimer_resolution: if (interval < hrtimer_resolution) interval = hrtimer_resolution; So the SOFT timer re-fires at the maximum rate forever, holding sk_receive_queue.lock each pass. One CPU spins in softirq until the socket is closed. Repeat with more rings and the machine is gone. The overflow itself is ancient - it was introduced together with TPACKET_V3 in f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation."). Its effect prior to f7460d2989fa ("net: af_packet: Use hrtimer to do the retire operation", v6.18) was not as clear-cut, though: the return value was stored into an unsigned short retire_blk_tov, so a negative result was truncated, and a 0-jiffy delay loop could be programmed as well. Neither is nearly as detrimental as the immediate maximum-rate spin the hrtimer conversion turned it into. (Unrelated to CVE-2019-20812 - that one was the ethtool failure path returning 0, which now returns DEFAULT_PRB_RETIRE_TOV.) Reproducer, needs CAP_NET_RAW (a --network host container has it by default) and a 1 Gbps NIC (QEMU e1000 works): int fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_ALL)); bind(fd, ...); int v = TPACKET_V3; setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VERSION, &v, sizeof(v)); struct tpacket_req3 req = { .tp_block_size = 0x10000000, .tp_block_nr = 1, .tp_frame_size = 2048, .tp_frame_nr = 0x10000000 / 2048, .tp_retire_blk_tov = 0, }; setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)); Compute in 64 bits instead. The operands are already bounded by the existing validation, so nothing else changes. If you'd prefer a different fix, just say so and I'll respin.

References

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