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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-99059: Linux kernel · wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation

Source GCVE Database

0
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-99059· High 7.7

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.7 High · fixed in fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295 : patch Linux kernel soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.7High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 38% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295, d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e, c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04 +2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 23 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd, < fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295
Fixed in
  • fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd, < d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e
Fixed in
  • d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd, < c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04
Fixed in
  • c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd, < 4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a
Fixed in
  • 4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd, < 3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20
Fixed in
  • 3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • =5.6
Fixed in–

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A. Thread A Thread B Thread C down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.

References

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