CVE-2026-99709: Linux kernel · inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue
Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · fixed in b7f84486c44c2ce03dffe5f09a42a38acbaa1551 : patch Linux kernel soon.
Data as of 20 Nov 2026, 07:34 UTC
Rated by Threat Radar · CVSS not yet scored by NVD
Thin evidence
One scorer or none- Patch
- Available – fixed in b7f84486c44c2ce03dffe5f09a42a38acbaa1551, 6.9, 6.7 +5
Exploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 20 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 19 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue The truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by the per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit. inet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int. If this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc adjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own reference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket. This can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace, raising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep a large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core(). Track the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse a fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill the queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of legitimate traffic.