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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-123581: DNSSEC validation accepted an unrelated signed RRset as the answer (hickory-proto)

Affects hickory-protoSource GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-123581· Medium 6.9

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 0.26.0-beta.1 when convenient.

Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 15:47 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
6.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 4.06.9
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 3.15.3
CNACVSS 4.06.9
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.26.0-beta.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 8 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 12 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade hickory-proto to 0.26.0-beta.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
crates.iohickory-protopkg:cargo/hickory-protoOther threatsAffected
  • >=0.0.0-0 <0.26.0-beta.1
Fixed in
  • 0.26.0-beta.1

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

A patch is available in hickory-net version 0.26.2, which corrects the DNSSEC validation logic. Users of hickory-proto should upgrade to version 0.26.0-beta.1 or later, which uses the fixed hickory-net crate. No other mitigation is required as the fix addresses the root cause.

Description

A vulnerability in hickory-proto up to version 0.26.0-alpha.1 causes DNSSEC validation to incorrectly accept a signed RRset from a DNS response even if it does not match the queried name and type. This allows an attacker who can modify DNS responses to provide a valid signed RRset for a different name or type, which is mistakenly accepted as a valid answer. The issue was fixed by moving DNSSEC validation to the hickory-net crate and correcting the validation logic in hickory-net 0.26.2. Users relying on DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto versions should upgrade to 0.26.0-beta.1 or later where the fix is included.

References

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