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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-114096: Dulwich · Symlink write-through in checkout(paths=[]) via raw os.open bypasses all symlink protections

Affects dvcSource GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-114096· High 7.3

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.3 High : upgrade to 3.67.1_10 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
7.3High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 4.07.3
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 3.17.8
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 3.67.1_10
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 21 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade dvc to 3.67.1_10.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Homebrewdvcpkg:brew/dvcOther threatsAffected
  • >=3.62.0 <3.67.1_10
Fixed in
  • 3.67.1_10

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary Dulwich's `porcelain.checkout(paths=[...])` code path writes files using raw `os.open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, mode)` followed by `f.write(obj.data)`. This code path does NOT call `build_file_from_blob()` at all, completely bypassing any symlink protections (including the unreleased d09f8af fix). `os.open` without `O_NOFOLLOW` follows symlinks at both the target file and intermediate directories, allowing arbitrary file writes. ## Root Cause At `dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py:5661-5675`, the `checkout(paths=[...])` implementation: ```python file_path = _checked_worktree_path(r, path) os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(file_path), exist_ok=True) flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC with os.fdopen(os.open(file_path, flags, mode), "wb") as f: f.write(obj.data) ``` `_checked_worktree_path()` (line 601-631) only performs name validation — checking that the path doesn't start with `/` or `\\` and that components pass `INVALID_DOTNAMES` checks. It performs zero filesystem symlink detection. ## Impact An attacker can craft a malicious repository that, when a victim clones it and runs `checkout(paths=[...])`, writes attacker-controlled content (with attacker-controlled permissions) to any filesystem location accessible to the user. Writing to `.git/hooks/post-checkout` achieves RCE on the next git checkout. ## Attack Scenario 1. Attacker creates a repository where HEAD has `trigger` as a symlink (mode 120000, content `../../.git/hooks/post-checkout`), and tag `v1.0` has `trigger` as an executable file (mode 100755, content `#!/bin/sh\nmalicious_payload`) 2. Victim clones the repository — worktree has `trigger` → `../../.git/hooks/post-checkout` (a symlink) 3. Victim runs `porcelain.checkout(repo, target="v1.0", paths=["trigger"])` to restore a specific file from a tag 4. `_checked_worktree_path(r, "trigger")` passes — name validation only, no symlink check 5. `os.open("trigger", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0o755)` follows the symlink → opens `.git/hooks/post-checkout` for writing 6. `f.write(obj.data)` writes the malicious payload to the hook 7. Next checkout operation triggers the hook → RCE ## Suggested Fix Replace the raw `os.open` path with a call to `build_file_from_blob` (once that function is hardened against intermediate symlinks), or add explicit symlink detection: resolve the path with `os.path.realpath()` and verify it stays within the worktree root before opening. Reported by **zx (Jace)**

References

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