Exposure of the message authentication key through the encryption keystream in the stream mode of IesEngine (an
Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 2.7.0 soon.
Data as of 15 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.7.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 2 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 15 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade bc-csharp and BouncyCastle.Cryptography to 2.7.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.bc-csharp | Affected
| Fixed in
|
NuGetBouncyCastle.Cryptographypkg:nuget/BouncyCastle.CryptographyOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
If you cannot patch yet, avoid using the stream mode of IesEngine without a block cipher in affected versions of bc-csharp. Consider alternative cryptographic constructions that do not expose the MAC key through the keystream.
Description
A vulnerability in the stream mode of IesEngine in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before version 2.7.0 allows exposure of the message authentication key through the encryption keystream. An attacker who observes one encrypted message with known plaintext can forge shorter messages that the recipient will accept as authentic. This occurs because the MAC key is derived directly from the key derivation output following a keystream equal in length to the message, and the derivation input depends only on static keys and fixed parameters.