File-Binding, Process-Binding, and Silo-Binding - new process impersonation techniques for EDR evasion
This threat involves three new Windows process impersonation techniques—File-Binding, Process-Binding, and Silo-Binding—that abuse the Bind Filter feature to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools. These techniques allow an attacker with local administrator rights to make one file appear as another to path-based defenses, effectively bypassing security monitoring and controls. File-Binding redirects what a target loads or reads, Process-Binding alters the reported image path of a running process, and Silo-Binding scopes redirection within Windows containers to evade multiple security products simultaneously. The threat requires prior local admin compromise and targets evasion of endpoint security solutions. No vulnerable driver or exploit is needed, as this leverages legitimate Windows functionality. The techniques can also enable privilege escalation in containerized environments.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The Bind Filter Windows feature can be abused by attackers with local administrator privileges to perform process impersonation through three methods: File-Binding, Process-Binding, and Silo-Binding. File-Binding hijacks file loads by shadowing paths such as amsi.dll or EDR sensor DLLs, causing security products to load attacker-controlled code. Process-Binding causes the image path reported for a running process to differ from the actual executable, misleading EDR callbacks and monitoring tools. Silo-Binding confines the redirect to a Windows container silo, pairing it with an inverse global link to evade AppLocker, Windows Firewall, and Sysmon simultaneously. These techniques enable attackers to bypass path-based endpoint defenses without exploiting vulnerabilities or drivers. The threat model assumes the host is already compromised with admin rights, aiming to evade detection and potentially escalate privileges in containerized environments.
Potential Impact
Attackers with local administrator access can use these techniques to evade detection by endpoint security products, including EDRs, AppLocker, Windows Firewall, and Sysmon. This allows malicious code to run undetected by making security tools load attacker-controlled files or report incorrect process information. Additionally, in containerized environments, these techniques can facilitate privilege escalation to SYSTEM. The impact is limited to already compromised systems where the attacker has elevated privileges; it does not represent a remote code execution or initial compromise vector.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Since these techniques abuse legitimate Windows features without requiring vulnerable drivers or exploits, traditional patching may not be immediately available. Defenders should monitor vendor advisories, including Bitdefender's research, for updates on detection and mitigation strategies. Implementing behavioral detection rules that identify anomalies in file loading and process image paths may help detect these techniques. No official fix or temporary workaround is currently documented.
File-Binding, Process-Binding, and Silo-Binding - new process impersonation techniques for EDR evasion
Description
This threat involves three new Windows process impersonation techniques—File-Binding, Process-Binding, and Silo-Binding—that abuse the Bind Filter feature to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools. These techniques allow an attacker with local administrator rights to make one file appear as another to path-based defenses, effectively bypassing security monitoring and controls. File-Binding redirects what a target loads or reads, Process-Binding alters the reported image path of a running process, and Silo-Binding scopes redirection within Windows containers to evade multiple security products simultaneously. The threat requires prior local admin compromise and targets evasion of endpoint security solutions. No vulnerable driver or exploit is needed, as this leverages legitimate Windows functionality. The techniques can also enable privilege escalation in containerized environments.
Reddit Discussion
TL;DR: One documented Windows feature, the Bind Filter, gives an attacker who already holds local administrator rights three ways to make one file look like another to every path-based defense on the box. No vulnerable driver, no exploit. Bitdefender Labs named and documented all three: File-Binding, Process-Binding, and Silo-Binding:
- File-Binding hijacks what a target loads or reads. Shadow the path of amsi.dll or an EDR's user-mode sensor DLL, and the security product loads the attacker's code in place of its own.
- Process-Binding shadows an executable so the image path reported for a running process points at a different file than the one executing. The process-creation callback your EDR trusts, and tools like Process Explorer and Sysmon, all report the wrong file.
- Silo-Binding ("Ghost in the Silo") scopes the redirect to a single silo (the isolation primitive behind Windows containers) and pairs it with an inverse global link, so a path resolves to malware inside the silo and to the clean file everywhere else. It defeats AppLocker, Windows Firewall, and Sysmon at once, and slips the bind-link veto that would otherwise flag it.
The threat model is the same as BYOVD: the host is already compromised and the attacker has admin, looking for a way to bypass endpoint security (a.k.a "EDR killers"). There are some interesting consequences, e.g. members of Docker users can escalate to SYSTEM using this technique.
Link to the research: Bind Link Abuse: One Windows Feature, Many Ways to Blind Your EDR
All three are the newest entries in an old process impersonation family, I wrote a companion explainer that walks the whole family and the behavioral signals that catch each one (with a bit of information why it's possible in Windows architecture). Still working on diagrams, but thought this could be useful to someone that's interested to learn more: What is Process Impersonation
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The Bind Filter Windows feature can be abused by attackers with local administrator privileges to perform process impersonation through three methods: File-Binding, Process-Binding, and Silo-Binding. File-Binding hijacks file loads by shadowing paths such as amsi.dll or EDR sensor DLLs, causing security products to load attacker-controlled code. Process-Binding causes the image path reported for a running process to differ from the actual executable, misleading EDR callbacks and monitoring tools. Silo-Binding confines the redirect to a Windows container silo, pairing it with an inverse global link to evade AppLocker, Windows Firewall, and Sysmon simultaneously. These techniques enable attackers to bypass path-based endpoint defenses without exploiting vulnerabilities or drivers. The threat model assumes the host is already compromised with admin rights, aiming to evade detection and potentially escalate privileges in containerized environments.
Potential Impact
Attackers with local administrator access can use these techniques to evade detection by endpoint security products, including EDRs, AppLocker, Windows Firewall, and Sysmon. This allows malicious code to run undetected by making security tools load attacker-controlled files or report incorrect process information. Additionally, in containerized environments, these techniques can facilitate privilege escalation to SYSTEM. The impact is limited to already compromised systems where the attacker has elevated privileges; it does not represent a remote code execution or initial compromise vector.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Since these techniques abuse legitimate Windows features without requiring vulnerable drivers or exploits, traditional patching may not be immediately available. Defenders should monitor vendor advisories, including Bitdefender's research, for updates on detection and mitigation strategies. Implementing behavioral detection rules that identify anomalies in file loading and process image paths may help detect these techniques. No official fix or temporary workaround is currently documented.
Technical Details
- Source Type
- Subreddit
- cybersecurity
- Reddit Score
- 0
- Discussion Level
- minimal
- Content Source
- reddit_link_post
- Post Type
- link
- Domain
- null
- Newsworthiness Assessment
- {"score":27,"reasons":["external_link","established_author","very_recent"],"isNewsworthy":true,"foundNewsworthy":[],"foundNonNewsworthy":[]}
- Has External Source
- true
- Trusted Domain
- false
Threat ID: 6a57ab8e68715ace43fd7084
Added to database: 07/15/2026, 15:47:26 UTC
Last enriched: 07/15/2026, 15:50:28 UTC
Last updated: 07/15/2026, 16:47:21 UTC
Views: 4
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