CVE-2026-112936: filelock · ReadWriteLock follows a symlink at the lock path into SQLite

### Summary `ReadWriteLock` and `AsyncReadWriteLock` resolve the lock path with `pathlib.Path.resolve()` and pass it to `sqlite3.connect()` without refusing a symlink. A local user who can create names in the lock's directory, such as `/tmp` or a shared cache, can plant a symlink at the lock path and make the victim's process create, lock, or write the file it points to, or break mutual exclusion between the victim's own processes. ### Details `ReadWriteLock.__init__` stores `pathlib.Path(lock_file).resolve()`, which follows a final symlink, and every connection opens that path through `sqlite3.connect()` with no `O_NOFOLLOW` or regular-file check. SQLite's own VFS also resolves the final symlink in user space, so `fs.protected_symlinks` and the sticky bit do not help: the kernel never sees a symlink to refuse. The other lock classes do not follow a final symlink: `FileLock` opens with `O_NOFOLLOW`, and `SoftReadWriteLock` coordinates through `<path>.rw/`. ### Proof of concept On Linux, with the victim and attacker as different users and `/shared` mode 1777 with `fs.protected_symlinks=1`: 1. The attacker runs `ln -s /home/victim/private/pwned.flag /shared/app.rwlock.db`. 2. The victim constructs `ReadWriteLock("/shared/app.rwlock.db")`. A plain `os.open(..., O_NOFOLLOW)` on the same path fails, but the lock creates `/home/victim/private/pwned.flag`, owned by the victim, inside a directory the attacker cannot write. 3. With `/shared/cache.rwlock.db -> /shared/a.db`, one victim process holds the write lock. The attacker repoints the link to `/shared/b.db`, and a second victim process acquires the write lock while the first still holds it. The same behavior reproduces on macOS, on Windows 11, and through `AsyncReadWriteLock`. ### Impact A local attacker with write access to the lock directory can make the victim create empty files it owns at paths the attacker cannot write, make the victim hold a SQLite lock on another application's database so that application gets `database is locked`, and give two victim processes the write lock at once, letting them corrupt the resource the lock protects. ### Workarounds Keep `ReadWriteLock` paths in directories that only trusted users can write.

• github.com/tox-dev/filelock/security/advisories/GHSA-j8f7-rjxc-mr56 (opens in a new tab)
• nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112936 (opens in a new tab)
• github.com/tox-dev/filelock/commit/4d45e83caf7e31f9a12fb44526bdc07f70114f04 (opens in a new tab)
• github.com/tox-dev/filelock (opens in a new tab)
• github.com/tox-dev/filelock/releases/tag/4.0.9 (opens in a new tab)

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