flyto-core · Flyto2 Core: SSRF guard bypass via DNS rebinding (validate_url_ssrf resolves-then-connects without pinning)
Affects flyto-coreSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High : upgrade to 2.26.8 soon.
Data as of 20 Nov 2026, 01:48 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 3.1 | 7.1 |
|---|
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.26.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 19 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 19 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade flyto-core to 2.26.8.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| PyPIflyto-core | Affected
| Fixed in
|
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AI-suggested
A patch is available in flyto-core version 2.26.8 that fixes this vulnerability by pinning the resolved IP address and ensuring the connection uses the validated IP rather than re-resolving the hostname. Users should upgrade to version 2.26.8 or later. The vendor advisory recommends modifying the guarded_aiohttp_request function to connect using the pinned IP address, for example by using a custom resolver or TCPConnector in aiohttp that enforces IP validation at connect time. No other mitigations such as redirect revalidation or DNS caching prevent this issue. Until patched, avoid using attacker-controlled hostnames in guarded HTTP modules.
Description
flyto-core versions prior to 2.26.8 contain a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) guard bypass vulnerability due to DNS rebinding. The SSRF guard resolves the hostname once and validates the IPs, but the actual connection performs a separate DNS resolution without pinning the validated IP. This allows an attacker controlling DNS to flip the resolved IP from a public to a private/internal address between the guard's check and the connection, bypassing protections and potentially accessing internal services such as cloud metadata endpoints.
References
- github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-6pm8-6f34-9v3g (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/bf748df864d348004cf45d830bc59f62c5c4a58a (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/flytohub/flyto-core (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.8 (opens in a new tab)