GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv: Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and RCE via body-supplied row id in project and project_file handlers
### Summary `Project.AddFile`, `Project.EditFile`, `Project.RemoveFile`, and `Project.Edit` in `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go` accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding `model.ProjectFile.GetData` and `model.Project.GetData` queries filter only by row id. A user holding the `manager` role (or any role that includes the `FileSync` / `EditProject` permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because `Edit` runs `git remote set-url` on the project's working tree. ### Affected `zhenorzz/goploy` `develop` HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the `zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5` Docker image (`docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44`). The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API. ### Vulnerable code `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile` (creates file under any project's directory; body controls `projectId`): ```go func (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ProjectID int64 `json:"projectId" validate:"required,gt=0"` Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"` Filename string `json:"filename" validate:"required"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename) // ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content) id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow() } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile` (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row): ```go func (Project) EditFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ID int64 `json:"id" validate:"required,gt=0"` Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData() // ... os.Create(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)) file.WriteString(reqData.Content) } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::RemoveFile` (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id): ```go func (Project) RemoveFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ProjectFileID int64 `json:"projectFileId" validate:"required,gt=0"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ProjectFileID}.GetData() if err := os.Remove(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)); err != nil { ... } } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::Edit` (updates any project's metadata; on URL change runs `git remote set-url` in the project working tree): ```go func (Project) Edit(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { // ... ReqData has ID, Name, URL, Branch, Script, etc. projectData, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData() model.Project{ID: reqData.ID, Name: reqData.Name, URL: reqData.URL, ...}.EditRow() if reqData.URL != projectData.URL { srcPath := config.GetProjectPath(projectData.ID) cmd := exec.Command("git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", reqData.URL) cmd.Dir = srcPath } } ``` `internal/model/project_file.go::ProjectFile.GetData` filters only by row id, no namespace join: ```go func (pf ProjectFile) GetData() (ProjectFile, error) { err := sq. Select("id, project_id, filename, insert_time, update_time"). From(projectFileTable). Where(sq.Eq{"id": pf.ID}). ... } ``` `internal/server/route.go::Route.hasPermission` checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to `gp.Namespace.ID`: ```go func (r Route) hasPermission(permissionIDs map[int64]struct{}) error { if len(r.permissionIDs) == 0 { return nil } for _, permissionID := range r.permissionIDs { if _, ok := permissionIDs[permissionID]; ok { return nil } } return errors.New("no permission") } ``` ### Reachable Any logged-in user assigned the `manager` role in their own namespace can call `/project/addFile`, `/project/editFile`, `/project/removeFile`, and `/project/edit`. The seeded `manager` role (`role.id = 1`) is granted both `FileSync` (`permission.id = 68`) and `EditProject` (`permission.id = 17`) by `database/goploy.sql`. Multi-tenant deployments typically assign `manager` to each ten
GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv: Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and RCE via body-supplied row id in project and project_file handlers
Description
### Summary `Project.AddFile`, `Project.EditFile`, `Project.RemoveFile`, and `Project.Edit` in `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go` accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding `model.ProjectFile.GetData` and `model.Project.GetData` queries filter only by row id. A user holding the `manager` role (or any role that includes the `FileSync` / `EditProject` permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because `Edit` runs `git remote set-url` on the project's working tree. ### Affected `zhenorzz/goploy` `develop` HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the `zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5` Docker image (`docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44`). The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API. ### Vulnerable code `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile` (creates file under any project's directory; body controls `projectId`): ```go func (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ProjectID int64 `json:"projectId" validate:"required,gt=0"` Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"` Filename string `json:"filename" validate:"required"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename) // ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content) id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow() } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile` (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row): ```go func (Project) EditFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ID int64 `json:"id" validate:"required,gt=0"` Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData() // ... os.Create(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)) file.WriteString(reqData.Content) } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::RemoveFile` (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id): ```go func (Project) RemoveFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ProjectFileID int64 `json:"projectFileId" validate:"required,gt=0"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ProjectFileID}.GetData() if err := os.Remove(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)); err != nil { ... } } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::Edit` (updates any project's metadata; on URL change runs `git remote set-url` in the project working tree): ```go func (Project) Edit(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { // ... ReqData has ID, Name, URL, Branch, Script, etc. projectData, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData() model.Project{ID: reqData.ID, Name: reqData.Name, URL: reqData.URL, ...}.EditRow() if reqData.URL != projectData.URL { srcPath := config.GetProjectPath(projectData.ID) cmd := exec.Command("git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", reqData.URL) cmd.Dir = srcPath } } ``` `internal/model/project_file.go::ProjectFile.GetData` filters only by row id, no namespace join: ```go func (pf ProjectFile) GetData() (ProjectFile, error) { err := sq. Select("id, project_id, filename, insert_time, update_time"). From(projectFileTable). Where(sq.Eq{"id": pf.ID}). ... } ``` `internal/server/route.go::Route.hasPermission` checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to `gp.Namespace.ID`: ```go func (r Route) hasPermission(permissionIDs map[int64]struct{}) error { if len(r.permissionIDs) == 0 { return nil } for _, permissionID := range r.permissionIDs { if _, ok := permissionIDs[permissionID]; ok { return nil } } return errors.New("no permission") } ``` ### Reachable Any logged-in user assigned the `manager` role in their own namespace can call `/project/addFile`, `/project/editFile`, `/project/removeFile`, and `/project/edit`. The seeded `manager` role (`role.id = 1`) is granted both `FileSync` (`permission.id = 68`) and `EditProject` (`permission.id = 17`) by `database/goploy.sql`. Multi-tenant deployments typically assign `manager` to each ten
CVSS v3.1
Affected software
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Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.4.0
- Aliases
- ["CVE-2026-53552"]
- Ecosystems
- ["Go"]
- Database Specific Severity
- CRITICAL
- Cvss Version
- 3.1
Threat ID: 6a4e4ee7c9d9e3dbe3289b43
Added to database: 07/08/2026, 13:21:43 UTC
Last updated: 07/08/2026, 13:21:43 UTC
Views: 1
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