Recce OSS server deployments exposing the query run API without authentication are vulnerable to unauthenticated SQL execution. Specifically, when using DuckDB as the backend, attackers can leverage DuckDB filesystem primitives to perform arbitrary local file read and write operations with the privileges of the Recce server process. This can lead to disclosure of sensitive files, tampering with Recce or dbt artifacts, modification of static files causing stored cross-site scripting, and modification of application files if writable. The severity is high due to the potential for privilege escalation and persistent compromise. The issue is fixed in Recce version 1.50.0 by restricting unsafe file operations and hardening the query execution path.

The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL queries on the Recce server's DuckDB backend, enabling local file read and write operations with the server process's privileges. This can result in disclosure of sensitive local files, tampering with internal artifacts, persistent cross-site scripting via modified static files, and potential modification of application files. If the server runs as root, the attacker gains root-level file access on the host or container, significantly increasing the risk and impact.

A patch is available in Recce version 1.50.0 that restricts unsafe file read/write behavior and hardens the query execution path. Users should upgrade to version 1.50.0 or later. Until upgrading, users should avoid exposing the Recce server to untrusted networks or the public internet without authentication. Recommended mitigations include enabling authentication, placing Recce behind an authenticated reverse proxy or VPN, running the server as a non-root user, using a read-only filesystem for the application where possible, and ensuring sensitive files or credentials are not accessible to the Recce process.