Rucio versions using the default json_meta metadata plugin with Oracle database backends are vulnerable to SQL injection in the FilterEngine.create_sqla_query method. The vulnerability is due to direct Python string formatting of attacker-controlled filter keys and values into SQLAlchemy text() expressions without parameterization. This occurs specifically in the Oracle dialect branch where JSON metadata filters are constructed using json_exists() with unescaped inputs. The injection vector is the DID search API endpoint, which accepts filter parameters from authenticated users. The unsafe interpolation bypasses all sanitization layers, enabling arbitrary SQL execution and potential full database compromise. Non-Oracle backends use parameterized queries and are not vulnerable. The affected versions are explicitly stated as >=1.27.0 <35.8.5, >=36.0.0 <38.5.5, >=39.0.0 <39.4.2, and >=40.0.0 <40.1.1.

Successful exploitation allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL commands on the Oracle backend database. This can lead to full compromise of the database, including unauthorized extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability undermines the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the Rucio data management system when using Oracle with the default json_meta plugin configuration.

Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until an official fix is available, users should consider disabling the json_meta plugin or avoid using Oracle as the backend database for Rucio. Restricting access to the DID search API to trusted users only may reduce risk. Monitor vendor channels for updates and apply official patches once released.