Gitea's restore-repo command processes user-supplied release.yml files from an archive, passing the DownloadURL field of release attachments to uri.Open(), which supports file:// URIs without validation. This allows an attacker with operator-level privileges who can supply a crafted archive to cause the server to read arbitrary local files and save their contents as release attachments. The vulnerability arises from lack of scheme validation and path restrictions in uri.Open(), enabling local file inclusion (LFI).

An attacker with operator or admin access who can run the restore-repo command with a crafted archive can read any file on the server filesystem accessible to the Gitea process user. This includes sensitive files such as configuration files containing database passwords and secret keys, SSH private keys, TLS certificates and keys, cloud provider credentials, and any other readable files. The exfiltrated file contents are stored silently as release attachments and can be retrieved via the Gitea API, potentially leading to credential and key disclosure.

Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until an official fix is available, restrict operator and admin access to the restore-repo command and avoid restoring repositories from untrusted archives. Monitor vendor communications for patches addressing this vulnerability and apply them promptly once released.