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VulnerabilityPublished

Hacking your life with AI can get you hacked: How AI orchestration platforms ship RCE by design

Source Reddit NetSec

0
Severity
Medium

Rated by Threat Radar

Data as of 18 Aug 2026, 14:34 UTC

What to do

AI-suggested

Some vendors have closed reports as working-as-intended, indicating no immediate patch may be forthcoming. Users should carefully evaluate deployment models and avoid exposing these orchestration platforms to unauthenticated network access. Restricting access to trusted users and isolating workflow modification capabilities can reduce risk. Monitoring vendor advisories and applying any future official fixes or configuration recommendations is advised.

Discussion

Research by Peyton Kennedy reveals that several AI orchestration platforms, including NocoBase, Flowise, Langflow, Dify, Activepieces, Kestra, and Apache Airflow, ship with remote code execution (RCE) capabilities by design. These platforms assume that anyone who can modify a workflow is trusted to execute code on the host, an assumption that is unsafe for multi-tenant HTTP services exposed to unauthenticated webhooks. The research documents 14 findings showing that unauthenticated requests can lead to RCE through prompt injection and bypassing of regex-based filters. Some vendors consider this behavior intentional, reflecting a mismatch between developer tool threat models and production deployment risks. The full research was presented at DEFCON 34 and is publicly available.

r/netsec (opens in a new tab)u/p80n-sec0 points0 comments

Author here. I audited NocoBase, Flowise, Langflow, Dify, Activepieces, Kestra, and Airflow and disclosed 14 findings. Every platform inherited the same assumption anyone who can touch a workflow is trusted to run code on the host, which is fine for a dev tool on your laptop but not fine for a multi-tenant HTTP service with an unauthenticated webhook. The chain I'd point people to first is the Flowise one (section 2.2): an unauthenticated request → prompt injection → LLM emits Python → a 38-pattern regex blocklist passes it because the dangerous library was pre-imported before the model was asked anything → RCE.

Two vendors closed their reports as working-as-intended, and I tried to represent their position fairly.

This research was also presented at DEFCON 34 but now available publicly.

Happy to answer questions.

Full whitepaper is available here: https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/how-ai-orchestration-platforms-ship-rce-by-design

References

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