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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-100858: heym before 0.0.109 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Slack, Discord, and

Source GCVE Database

0
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-100858· High 7.6

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.6 High : upgrade to 0.0.109 soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 10:12 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
7.6High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 27% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.0.109
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

t = 0 is the CVE’s publication on cve.org

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 27 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: evidence found.

    CISA SSVC: proof of concept public

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

Timeline

  1. CVE ID reserved

    by VulnCheck

    , 1 hour before disclosure

  2. CVE published

    on cve.org

    , t = 0

  3. CISA SSVC assessment

    proof of concept public

    , 3 days after disclosure

  4. In Threat Radar

    record ingested

    , 29 days after disclosure

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), CISA SSVC, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade heym to 0.0.109.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
heymrunheymAffected
  • <0.0.109
Fixed in
  • 0.0.109

Description

heym before 0.0.109 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Slack, Discord, and Crawler workflow nodes. These nodes issue HTTP requests to URLs taken from user-created credentials (webhook_url / flaresolverr_url) using an unguarded HTTP client, bypassing the SSRF egress guard that already protects the HTTP, WebSocket, and MCP nodes; the credential API validates only that the URL is non-empty. Any registered user can create a credential pointing at an internal address and execute a workflow, causing the backend to reach loopback, private, link-local, or cloud-metadata endpoints and return the full response body in the node output (non-blind SSRF).

References

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