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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-92613: In Eclipse iceoryx-rs, versions 0.0.11 to 0.0.13 and 0.1.0 as well as on the latest main branch

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-92613· Low 1.0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 1.0 Low · end of life, no fix coming : replace or isolate Eclipse iceoryx™; no fix will be released.

Data as of 19 Nov 2026, 13:34 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
1.0Low
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (eclipse)CVSS 4.01.0
Patch
None coming – the product is end of life
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 19 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.

What to do

No fix will be released: Eclipse iceoryx™ is end of life. Replace it, or isolate it from untrusted networks until you can.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Eclipse FoundationEclipse iceoryx™Affected
  • >=0.0.11 <=0.1.0
Fixed in–
crates.iogithub/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx-rspkg:cargo/github/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx-rsOther threatsAffected
  • >=0.0.11 <=0.1.0
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

In Eclipse iceoryx-rs, versions 0.0.11 to 0.0.13 and 0.1.0 as well as on the latest main branch. `SampleReceiver::<T>::take()` and `Sample::<T>::deref()` are safe functions that hand the caller a `&T` pointing at a chunk written by another iceoryx process, but the subscriber path neither requires `T: ShmSend` nor verifies that the received chunk is at least `size_of::<T>()` bytes / `align_of::<T>()`-aligned. A peer process that publishes an undersized chunk, or any chunk at all when the subscriber chose a pointer-bearing `T`, drives a `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` subscriber into out-of-bounds reads of adjacent shared-memory chunks or dereference of a publisher-controlled pointer. Resolution: It will not be fixed since this is a known limitation in iceoryx as it is the users responsibility to specify the same data type on sender and receiver side. [iceoryx2](https://github.com/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx2) is the successor of iceoryx-rs where the API is designed to prevent this by default. It is strongly recommended to migrate to iceoryx2 which is actively maintained and receives security support. The iceoryx-rs package has officially reached End-of-life and will not receive any features, bugfixes or security fixes.

References

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