CVE-2026-92613: In Eclipse iceoryx-rs, versions 0.0.11 to 0.0.13 and 0.1.0 as well as on the latest main branch
Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 1.0 Low · end of life, no fix coming : replace or isolate Eclipse iceoryx™; no fix will be released.
Data as of 19 Nov 2026, 13:34 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (eclipse) | CVSS 4.0 | 1.0 |
|---|
- Patch
- None coming – the product is end of life
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 19 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
No fix will be released: Eclipse iceoryx™ is end of life. Replace it, or isolate it from untrusted networks until you can.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Eclipse FoundationEclipse iceoryx™ | Affected
| Fixed in– |
crates.iogithub/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx-rspkg:cargo/github/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx-rsOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
In Eclipse iceoryx-rs, versions 0.0.11 to 0.0.13 and 0.1.0 as well as on the latest main branch. `SampleReceiver::<T>::take()` and `Sample::<T>::deref()` are safe functions that hand the caller a `&T` pointing at a chunk written by another iceoryx process, but the subscriber path neither requires `T: ShmSend` nor verifies that the received chunk is at least `size_of::<T>()` bytes / `align_of::<T>()`-aligned. A peer process that publishes an undersized chunk, or any chunk at all when the subscriber chose a pointer-bearing `T`, drives a `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` subscriber into out-of-bounds reads of adjacent shared-memory chunks or dereference of a publisher-controlled pointer. Resolution: It will not be fixed since this is a known limitation in iceoryx as it is the users responsibility to specify the same data type on sender and receiver side. [iceoryx2](https://github.com/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx2) is the successor of iceoryx-rs where the API is designed to prevent this by default. It is strongly recommended to migrate to iceoryx2 which is actively maintained and receives security support. The iceoryx-rs package has officially reached End-of-life and will not receive any features, bugfixes or security fixes.