In DTLS 1.2 with AEAD cipher suites, each record includes an explicit IV and an authentication tag. The vulnerability arises because the record layer passes the record length to the cipher implementation before verifying that the record is long enough to contain the explicit IV and tag. If the record is shorter than this overhead, the cipher rejects the length, and the record layer raises a fatal internal_error alert instead of treating it as a failed authentication. This allows an attacker who can send datagrams to an existing DTLS 1.2 association to cause a denial of service by tearing down the association without knowledge of key material. The fix involves validating the record length against the explicit IV and tag length before AEAD processing, so TLS reports bad_record_mac and DTLS silently discards the record. There is no impact on confidentiality or memory safety, and no known exploits in the wild.

An attacker capable of sending datagrams to an existing DTLS 1.2 association can cause a denial of service by terminating the association. This attack does not compromise confidentiality or integrity, nor does it cause memory safety issues. The impact is limited to disruption of the targeted DTLS connection.

Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. The described fix involves validating record length before AEAD processing to prevent improper termination. Until a fix is applied, monitoring and controlling access to DTLS endpoints may help mitigate risk.