CVE-2025-64434: kubevirt.io/kubevirt · KubeVirt's Improper TLS Certificate Management Handling Allows API Identity Spoofing
Affects kubevirt.io/kubevirtSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.7 Medium : upgrade to 1.5.3 when convenient.
Data as of 19 Nov 2026, 02:13 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.5.3, 1.6.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 6 Nov 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade kubevirt.io/kubevirt to 1.5.3; kubevirt.io/kubevirt to 1.6.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Gokubevirt.io/kubevirt | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Gokubevirt.io/kubevirt | Affected
| Fixed in
|
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Description
### Summary Due to improper TLS certificate management, a compromised `virt-handler` could impersonate `virt-api` by using its own TLS credentials, allowing it to initiate privileged operations against another `virt-handler`. ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ Because of improper TLS certificate management, a compromised `virt-handler` instance can reuse its TLS bundle to impersonate `virt-api`, enabling unauthorized access to VM lifecycle operations on other `virt-handler` nodes. The `virt-api` component acts as a sub-resource server, and it proxies API VM lifecycle requests to `virt-handler` instances. The communication between `virt-api` and `virt-handler` instances is secured using mTLS. The former acts as a client while the latter as the server. The client certificate used by `virt-api` is defined in the source code as follows and have the following properties: ```go //pkg/virt-api/api.go const ( ... defaultCAConfigMapName = "kubevirt-ca" ... defaultHandlerCertFilePath = "/etc/virt-handler/clientcertificates/tls.crt" defaultHandlerKeyFilePath = "/etc/virt-handler/clientcertificates/tls.key" ) ``` ```bash # verify virt-api's certificate properties from the docker container in which it is deployed using Minikube admin@minikube:~$ openssl x509 -text -in \ $(CID=$(docker ps --filter 'Name=virt-api' --format '{{.ID}}' | head -n 1) && \ docker inspect $CID | grep "clientcertificates:ro" | cut -d ":" -f1 | \ tr -d '"[:space:]')/tls.crt | \ grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial" Serial Number: 127940157512425330 (0x1c688e539091f72) Issuer: CN = kubevirt.io@1747579138 Subject: CN = kubevirt.io:system:client:virt-handler ``` The `virt-handler` component verifies the signature of client certificates using a self-signed root CA. This latter is generated by `virt-operator` when the KubeVirt stack is deployed and it is stored within a ConfigMap in the `kubevirt` namespace. **This configmap is used as a trust anchor** by all `virt-handler` instances to verify client certificates. ```bash # inspect the self-signed root CA used to sign virt-api and virt-handler's certificates admin@minikube:~$ kubectl -n kubevirt get configmap kubevirt-ca -o jsonpath='{.data.ca-bundle}' | openssl x509 -text | grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial" Serial Number: 319368675363923930 (0x46ea01e3f7427da) Issuer: CN=kubevirt.io@1747579138 Subject: CN=kubevirt.io@1747579138 ``` The `kubevirt-ca` is also used to sign the server certificate which is used by a `virt-handler` instance: ```bash admin@minikube:~$ openssl x509 -text -in \ $(CID=$(docker ps --filter 'Name=virt-handler' --format '{{.ID}}' | head -n 1) && \ docker inspect $CID | grep "servercertificates:ro" | cut -d ":" -f1 | \ tr -d '"[:space:]')/tls.crt | \ grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial" # the virt-handler's server ceriticate is issued by the same root CA Serial Number: 7584450293644921758 (0x6941615ba1500b9e) Issuer: CN = kubevirt.io@1747579138 Subject: CN = kubevirt.io:system:node:virt-handler ``` In addition to the validity of the signature, the `virt-handler` component also verifies the CN field of the presented certificate: <code.sec.SetupTLSForVirtHandlerServer> ```go //pkg/util/tls/tls.go func SetupTLSForVirtHandlerServer(caManager ClientCAManager, certManager certificate.Manager, externallyManaged bool, clusterConfig *virtconfig.ClusterConfig) *tls.Config { // #nosec cause: InsecureSkipVerify: true // resolution: Neither the client nor the server should validate anything itself, `VerifyPeerCertificate` is still executed //... // XXX: We need to verify the cert ourselves because we don't have DNS or IP on the certs at the moment VerifyPeerCertificate: func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error { return verifyPeerCert(rawCerts, externallyManaged, certPool, x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, "client") }, //... } func verifyPeerCert(rawCerts [][]byte, externallyManaged bool, certPool *x509.CertPool, usage x509.ExtKeyUsage, commonName string) error { //... rawPeer, rawIntermediates := rawCerts[0], rawCerts[1:] c, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rawPeer) //... fullCommonName := fmt.Sprintf("kubevirt.io:system:%s:virt-handler", commonName) if !externallyManaged && c.Subject.CommonName != fullCommonName { return fmt.Errorf("common name is invalid, expected %s, but got %s", fullCommonName, c.Subject.CommonName) } //... ``` The above code illustrates that client certificates accepted be KubeVirt should have as CN `kubevirt.io:system:client:virt-handler` which is the same as the CN present in the `virt-api`'s certificate. **However, the latter is not the only component in the KubeVirt stack which can communicate with a `virt-handler` instance**. In addition to the extension API server, any other `virt-handler` can communicate with it. This happens in the context of VM migration ope
References
- github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-ggp9-c99x-54gp (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64434 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/231dc69723f331dc02f65a31ab4c3d6869f40d6a (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/af2f08a9a186eccc650f87c30ab3e07b669e8b5b (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/commit/b9773bc588e6e18ece896a2dad5336ef7a653074 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt (opens in a new tab)