CVE-2026-119078VulnerabilityPublished 12 Nov 2026Updated 13 Nov 2026

Libcommons codec java: Apache Commons Codec's Blake3 class documented the output of its doFinalize methods as

Affects libcommons-codec-javaSource GCVE Database

Compare

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-119078· Critical 9.1

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical.

Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 22:04 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

9.1Critical

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none

CVSS scores by source
CISA-ADP	CVSS 3.1	9.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: High: There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
Integrity: High: There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 9 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Ubuntu 26.10libcommons-codec-java`pkg:deb/ubuntu/libcommons-codec-java?arch=source&distro=stonking`Other threats	Affected =1.18.0-1 =1.22.0-1	Fixed in–
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlibcommons-codec-java`pkg:deb/ubuntu/libcommons-codec-java?arch=source&distro=resolute`Other threats	Affected =1.18.0-1	Fixed in–
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlibcommons-codec-java`pkg:deb/ubuntu/libcommons-codec-java?arch=source&distro=noble`Other threats	Affected =1.15-1 =1.16.0-1	Fixed in–
Ubuntu 22.04 LTSlibcommons-codec-java`pkg:deb/ubuntu/libcommons-codec-java?arch=source&distro=jammy`Other threats	Affected =1.15-1	Fixed in–
Ubuntu 20.04 LTSlibcommons-codec-java`pkg:deb/ubuntu/libcommons-codec-java?arch=source&distro=focal`Other threats	Affected =1.11-1 =1.14-1	Fixed in–
Ubuntu 18.04 LTSlibcommons-codec-java`pkg:deb/ubuntu/libcommons-codec-java?arch=source&distro=bionic`Other threats	Affected =1.10-1 =1.11-1	Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

Apache Commons Codec's Blake3 class documented the output of its doFinalize methods as depending on any previously finalized bytes, so that consecutive calls would return different output. In fact, doFinalize does not change the hash state: calling it again without supplying more input returns the same bytes. The key-derivation example in the class Javadoc, shipped since 1.16.0, derives two keys with two consecutive doFinalize calls. Code that follows it gets identical keys, so the separation between the derived keys is lost. The same applies to any application that calls doFinalize more than once on one instance and expects new output each time. This issue affects Apache Commons Codec from 1.16.0 before 1.23.0. Version 1.23.0 corrects the documentation, but the behavior of doFinalize is unchanged. Upgrading alone does not fix affected code. Users should check their applications for repeated doFinalize calls on the same Blake3 instance and derive multiple keys by requesting the combined length in one call and splitting the output, as the updated Javadoc shows.

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…