Malicious code in bfox-build-utils (PyPI)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cae53348f8261653938b39ae3cb79101baff666c4216ecaeb635e34b42ba8293) At install time, setup.py harvests the installer's GitHub credential and uses it to modify the installer's own repository. The script reads `$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.git/config`, regexes the `extraheader = AUTHORIZATION: basic <b64>` line that actions/checkout injects for the running job, base64-decodes it to recover the token, and also reads `GITHUB_TOKEN` from the environment. Using that token as `x-access-token`, it clones the installer's repository, creates branch `feature/ci-health-check`, writes `.github/workflows/ci-health-check.yml`, commits as `github-actions[bot]` with message `Add CI health check`, and pushes via git (with a REST-API fallback), explicitly bypassing the API restriction that protects workflow files. This plants a persistent, attacker-controlled GitHub Actions workflow in the installer's repository that will execute on future pushes to the planted branch. The shipped Python module `bfox_build_utils.py` is a two-line stub containing only `VERSION = "1.0.997"`; the package's advertised purpose (`Build utilities.`) and the innocuous naming of the branch, commit, and bot identity are cover for the credential theft and workflow-injection payload in setup.py.
Malicious code in bfox-build-utils (PyPI)
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (cae53348f8261653938b39ae3cb79101baff666c4216ecaeb635e34b42ba8293) At install time, setup.py harvests the installer's GitHub credential and uses it to modify the installer's own repository. The script reads `$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/.git/config`, regexes the `extraheader = AUTHORIZATION: basic <b64>` line that actions/checkout injects for the running job, base64-decodes it to recover the token, and also reads `GITHUB_TOKEN` from the environment. Using that token as `x-access-token`, it clones the installer's repository, creates branch `feature/ci-health-check`, writes `.github/workflows/ci-health-check.yml`, commits as `github-actions[bot]` with message `Add CI health check`, and pushes via git (with a REST-API fallback), explicitly bypassing the API restriction that protects workflow files. This plants a persistent, attacker-controlled GitHub Actions workflow in the installer's repository that will execute on future pushes to the planted branch. The shipped Python module `bfox_build_utils.py` is a two-line stub containing only `VERSION = "1.0.997"`; the package's advertised purpose (`Build utilities.`) and the innocuous naming of the branch, commit, and bot identity are cover for the credential theft and workflow-injection payload in setup.py.
Affected software
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Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-17319
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Ecosystems
- ["PyPI"]
Threat ID: 6abcdde70df196e1a9da7330
Added to database: 09/30/2026, 10:01:11 UTC
Last updated: 09/30/2026, 12:58:02 UTC
Views: 3
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