Malicious code in bittensor-burn-alert (PyPI)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (06e89dc9ff0a5d334b67a01c572c036b0740adf6d8669d2fa25c241a0c098116) The package advertises itself as a Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitor but bundles a covert clipboard surveillance daemon in its compiled core module (bittensor_burn_watch/core.cpython-310-*.so). When the user runs the documented `bittensor-burn-alert install` command, the daemon installs persistence across all major operating systems — Windows Task Scheduler, Linux systemd user service, and macOS LaunchAgent — and starts polling the clipboard on every login. Clipboard contents are read via Win32 API on Windows (with a PowerShell fallback), `wl-paste --watch` on Wayland, and `xclip` on X11; the Linux path scrapes DISPLAY/DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS from the active graphical session and auto-installs `wl-clipboard`/`xclip` if missing. Each unique clipboard string (deduplicated via SQLite) is POSTed to `https://api.telegram.org` against a hardcoded bot token (8666228137) and chat ID (8766781014) shipped in `bittensor_burn_watch/defaults.env`. A comment inside the compiled binary explicitly labels these credentials as 'Bundled clipboard Telegram + taostats API (all pip users; not user-editable)' — the exfiltration channel is intentionally separated from the user-facing `BURN_TELEGRAM_*` configuration so installers cannot redirect or disable it. The binary further notes 'no window flash' / 'no taskbar flash' to evade user awareness. The Bittensor-themed naming targets TAO subnet operators, whose clipboards routinely carry wallet seed phrases, addresses, and API keys. ## Source: kam193 (fe199e0ca267ae05d6213339b5d925218af5b5c2d884dfb4c74bc99b81a19c0f) The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. Early versions contain this behavior mentioned in the README. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret phrases. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger Reasons (based on the campaign): - clipboard-stealing - crypto-related
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The bittensor-burn-alert package, advertised as a Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitor, includes a compiled core module that installs a persistent clipboard monitoring daemon on major operating systems. This daemon reads clipboard contents using platform-specific methods and sends deduplicated clipboard strings to a hardcoded Telegram bot token and chat ID. The exfiltration channel is deliberately separated from user-configurable settings to prevent redirection or disabling. The malware avoids user detection by suppressing window or taskbar notifications. The targeted data likely includes sensitive cryptocurrency credentials such as seed phrases and API keys, exploiting the typical clipboard usage patterns of TAO subnet operators.
Potential Impact
Users running affected versions of bittensor-burn-alert risk having sensitive clipboard data, including cryptocurrency wallet seed phrases, addresses, and API keys, covertly exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled Telegram bot. This compromises the confidentiality of critical credentials and can lead to theft of digital assets. The persistence mechanisms across Windows Task Scheduler, Linux systemd user service, and macOS LaunchAgent ensure ongoing data theft on every user login without user awareness.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is currently available for this malicious package. Users should immediately uninstall bittensor-burn-alert versions 1.7.3, 1.7.4, and 1.7.5 and avoid installing this package. Review systems for persistence mechanisms related to this package and remove any installed clipboard monitoring services. Exercise caution when installing packages from PyPI, especially those related to cryptocurrency, and verify package integrity and source before use.
Malicious code in bittensor-burn-alert (PyPI)
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (06e89dc9ff0a5d334b67a01c572c036b0740adf6d8669d2fa25c241a0c098116) The package advertises itself as a Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitor but bundles a covert clipboard surveillance daemon in its compiled core module (bittensor_burn_watch/core.cpython-310-*.so). When the user runs the documented `bittensor-burn-alert install` command, the daemon installs persistence across all major operating systems — Windows Task Scheduler, Linux systemd user service, and macOS LaunchAgent — and starts polling the clipboard on every login. Clipboard contents are read via Win32 API on Windows (with a PowerShell fallback), `wl-paste --watch` on Wayland, and `xclip` on X11; the Linux path scrapes DISPLAY/DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS from the active graphical session and auto-installs `wl-clipboard`/`xclip` if missing. Each unique clipboard string (deduplicated via SQLite) is POSTed to `https://api.telegram.org` against a hardcoded bot token (8666228137) and chat ID (8766781014) shipped in `bittensor_burn_watch/defaults.env`. A comment inside the compiled binary explicitly labels these credentials as 'Bundled clipboard Telegram + taostats API (all pip users; not user-editable)' — the exfiltration channel is intentionally separated from the user-facing `BURN_TELEGRAM_*` configuration so installers cannot redirect or disable it. The binary further notes 'no window flash' / 'no taskbar flash' to evade user awareness. The Bittensor-themed naming targets TAO subnet operators, whose clipboards routinely carry wallet seed phrases, addresses, and API keys. ## Source: kam193 (fe199e0ca267ae05d6213339b5d925218af5b5c2d884dfb4c74bc99b81a19c0f) The package contains code to steal clipboard content to a predefined remote location. If run in the right way, the code will periodically check the clipboard and if the content matches the pattern, exfiltrates it. Early versions contain this behavior mentioned in the README. The targeted data are likely cryptocurrency secret phrases. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-clip-logger Reasons (based on the campaign): - clipboard-stealing - crypto-related
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The bittensor-burn-alert package, advertised as a Bittensor subnet burn-rate monitor, includes a compiled core module that installs a persistent clipboard monitoring daemon on major operating systems. This daemon reads clipboard contents using platform-specific methods and sends deduplicated clipboard strings to a hardcoded Telegram bot token and chat ID. The exfiltration channel is deliberately separated from user-configurable settings to prevent redirection or disabling. The malware avoids user detection by suppressing window or taskbar notifications. The targeted data likely includes sensitive cryptocurrency credentials such as seed phrases and API keys, exploiting the typical clipboard usage patterns of TAO subnet operators.
Potential Impact
Users running affected versions of bittensor-burn-alert risk having sensitive clipboard data, including cryptocurrency wallet seed phrases, addresses, and API keys, covertly exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled Telegram bot. This compromises the confidentiality of critical credentials and can lead to theft of digital assets. The persistence mechanisms across Windows Task Scheduler, Linux systemd user service, and macOS LaunchAgent ensure ongoing data theft on every user login without user awareness.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is currently available for this malicious package. Users should immediately uninstall bittensor-burn-alert versions 1.7.3, 1.7.4, and 1.7.5 and avoid installing this package. Review systems for persistence mechanisms related to this package and remove any installed clipboard monitoring services. Exercise caution when installing packages from PyPI, especially those related to cryptocurrency, and verify package integrity and source before use.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-5330
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- []
- Ecosystems
- ["PyPI"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a50ba4568715ace4357e5dc
Added to database: 07/10/2026, 09:24:21 UTC
Last enriched: 07/10/2026, 09:37:07 UTC
Last updated: 07/31/2026, 19:45:10 UTC
Views: 23
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