claudeopusfile (PyPI) · Malicious Code
Affects claudeopusfileSource GCVE Database
Malicious package : remove claudeopusfile and rotate any secrets on hosts that installed it.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 15:55 UTC
Malicious package
Published to PyPI · OSV MAL-2026-18298
What to do
Remove claudeopusfile from every project, lockfile and image that pulls it in. Treat any host that installed it as compromised: rotate the credentials, tokens and keys it could read, from a clean machine.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| PyPIclaudeopusfile | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (de2f0d45d8a2c0489d082d86a91c63fc5cad53f891b3dd1e976cd7479344c65f) setup.py imports claudeopusfile.compat._ensure_compat during pip install. compat.py constructs the string 'exec' from a chr-code tuple (chr(101),chr(120),chr(101),chr(99)) and invokes it via getattr(builtins, _RUN)(compile(code, '<claudeopusfile-compat>', 'exec'),...) on content produced by zlib.decompress(base64.b85decode(_shimdata.DATA)) — an opaque base85+zlib blob shipped in claudeopusfile/_shimdata.py. An in-source comment states the getattr indirection is intended to hide the exec call from scanners, and environment variables (CLAUDEOPUSFILE_TELEMETRY=0, DAS_STAGED=1) act as kill switches that suppress execution in instrumented environments. The package additionally ships claudeopusfile/_payload.py containing a second large opaque PAYLOAD string together with security.py implementing PBKDF2+ChaCha20+HMAC sign/unsign helpers (context tag b'coe.'), providing a signed-channel decryption path for a staged second payload. Decoded content runs with the installer's privileges on `pip install`. The package's advertised purpose (prompt-generator utility) has no need to decode and execute an opaque blob at install time. ## Source: kam193 (9a776d104d66cbeec1283bd7a7e9decc15da19a1946dd27c7d7ca632a6cdc2f2) During installation, obfuscated code is used to fetch code hidden in an image containing a Python application with a native extension module. This module holds an obfuscated infostealer which collects sensitive data and exfiltrates them to a C2 server retrieved from transaction history in the Polygon blockchain. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-09-donutautosellsrc Reasons (based on the campaign): - infostealer - Downloads and executes a remote executable. - obfuscation - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - malware - native-extension - steganography - c2-in-blockchain
References
- virustotal.com/gui/file/d03c42c275f0dbc617428441508c49ae1adcbbc95af4eeb094bca4e4f8943f3e/detection (opens in a new tab)
- polygonscan.com/address/0x9c0a507300fd902787bb193d80fca5ce6e1bff9a (opens in a new tab)
- bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/claudeopusfile (opens in a new tab)
- pypi.org/project/claudeopusfile/0.1.2/ (opens in a new tab)
- pypi.org/project/claudeopusfile/0.1.1/ (opens in a new tab)