mrbios (PyPI) · Malicious Code
Affects mrbiosSource GCVE Database
Malicious package : remove mrbios and rotate any secrets on hosts that installed it.
Data as of 11 Jul 2026, 09:43 UTC
Malicious package
Published to PyPI · OSV MAL-2026-5282
What to do
Remove mrbios from every project, lockfile and image that pulls it in. Treat any host that installed it as compromised: rotate the credentials, tokens and keys it could read, from a clean machine.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| PyPImrbios | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8d1c97dced5d8f917e2e9901e0ed99fb0034bfafb5a3d46ad47eeba76a883c57) The package installs `mrbios-setup.pth` into site-packages. Python auto-loads.pth files at every interpreter startup, so the contained payload runs unconditionally for any `python` invocation on a machine where mrbios has been installed — not just when the package is explicitly imported. The payload is wrapped in an `exec()` of a string built from single-letter aliased imports (`_o`, `_s`, `_u`, `_p`, `_y`, `_T`, `_G`) to evade static review. When executed, it downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime from `https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/bun-{os}-{arch}.zip` to `/tmp/b/bun`, chmods it executable (mode 509 / 0o775), and invokes it to run a sibling `_index.js` shipped in the package. A `/tmp/.bun_ran` sentinel gates re-execution per temp directory. The package advertises itself as a 'bioinformatics scripts management tool' and has no documented need for a JavaScript runtime; the JS payload runs outside Python's introspectable surface, so its behavior is not visible to ordinary Python tooling. The combination of unconditional auto-execution via.pth, deliberate obfuscation, alien-runtime fetch from a non-publisher source, and execution of bundled JavaScript whose contents are opaque to the Python ecosystem constitutes an install/startup-time remote code execution surface against any installer. ## Source: kam193 (3bc0ad232af6f3dafcf2d02441531485e0b459c2659542375c62f4f7003c9e08) Versions 0.1.1, 0.1.2 were compromised. Compromised packages start an obfuscated infostealer. The infostealer is a heavily obfuscated JavaScript code executed using Bun runtime on Python startup. It collectes all kinds of sensitive data, including API keys, credentials to package repositories, cryptocurrency assets, password manager data. Infostealer actively queries online services to collect additional secrets as well as attempts to gain persistence and spread further by publishing infected packages using collected credentials. Data are exfiltrated likely using Github. The code seems to threaten to wipe the user's data if it detects invalid GitHub tokens. Cleanup should be done with caution. It seems to be related to the recent Mini Shai Hulud campaign. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-compr-woodpecker Reasons (based on the campaign): - compromised-package - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-cloud-tokens - exfiltration-credentials - abuses-pth - obfuscation - infostealer - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-crypto - files-exfiltration - destructive-actions
References
- socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-campaign-hits-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages (opens in a new tab)
- bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/campaign/2026-06-compr-woodpecker (opens in a new tab)
- socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-descends-to-hades-miasma-pypi-wave (opens in a new tab)
- o3.security/blog/pypi-supply-chain-attack-pth-file-miasma (opens in a new tab)
- socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-miasma-and-hades-worms-target-bioinformatics-and-mcp-developers-via-malicious (opens in a new tab)
- pypi.org/project/mrbios/0.1.1/ (opens in a new tab)
- pypi.org/project/mrbios/0.1.2/ (opens in a new tab)