CVE-2026-100842: MONAI through 1.6.0 contains an eval injection vulnerability in _get_fake_spatial_shape() in
Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.3 High.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 7% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
t = 0 is the CVE’s publication on cve.org
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 27 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: evidence found.
CISA SSVC: proof of concept public
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
Timeline
CVE ID reserved
by VulnCheck
, 2 hours before disclosure
CVE published
on cve.org
, t = 0
CISA SSVC assessment
proof of concept public
, 3 days after disclosure
In Threat Radar
record ingested
, 29 days after disclosure
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), CISA SSVC, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Project-MONAIMONAI | Affected
| Fixed in– |
PyPIMONAIpkg:pypi/MONAIOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
MONAI through 1.6.0 contains an eval injection vulnerability in _get_fake_spatial_shape() in monai/bundle/scripts.py. The function validates shape expressions with a helper that walks the AST and only collects ast.Name nodes, rejecting any name other than 'p' or 'n', before passing the string to eval(). Expressions built solely from constants and attribute, subscript, or call nodes (for example "(1).__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()" or "int.__class__.__init__.__globals__") contain no ast.Name nodes and therefore bypass the allowlist. Because the shape value originates from bundle metadata consumed by _get_real_input_data and verify_net_in_out (reachable through the bundle 'verify_net_in_out' CLI flow), an attacker who can influence a bundle's metadata can escape the eval sandbox via object introspection chains and achieve code execution in this non-default flow.