CVE-2026-48025: nebula-mesh · Decrypted CA private key persists in heap after signing
Affects github.com/juev/nebula-meshSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 0.3.7 when convenient.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 42% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.3.7
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 28 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade github.com/juev/nebula-mesh and github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh to 0.3.7.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Gogithub.com/juev/nebula-mesh | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Gogithub.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
`internal/pki/resolver.go:36-64` constructs a `CAManager` with the plaintext `ed25519.PrivateKey` after unwrapping via the master key; `internal/pki/ca.go:13-16` stores it. Callers at `internal/api/enroll.go:116`, `internal/api/updates.go:297`, and `internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:40` use the manager for one `Sign()` and drop the reference on function return — but the underlying slice contents are not wiped before release. The keystore package's contract (`internal/keystore/keystore.go` doc: *"Callers MUST zeroise the returned plaintext DEK as soon as it is no longer needed"*) is not met by the `CAManager` consumer. Decrypted CA private keys persist in process heap until Go's GC scavenges the underlying slice — minutes to hours under load, indefinitely on idle servers. ## Affected All released versions up to v0.3.6. ## Threat model Memory-read access: core dump, ptrace, kernel swap to disk, container/VM snapshot, OOM-debug bundle, side-channel via shared cache lines. Not a remote-network vulnerability, but defeats the master-key + envelope-encryption design's promise of "private key never lingers". ## Suggested fix Add a `Wipe()` method on `CAManager`: ```go // internal/pki/ca.go func (m *CAManager) Wipe() { if m == nil { return } keystore.Zeroize(m.caKey) } ``` At each call site (`enroll.go:116`, `updates.go:297`, `mobile_bundle.go:40`, and any new caller), `defer caMgr.Wipe()` immediately after the `Resolve()` call. Pattern mirrors the existing `defer keystore.Zeroize(dek)` discipline in the keystore package. Optional follow-up: wrap `m.Sign()` to zeroize after each call, removing the contract on callers — but the `defer` pattern is sufficient as a minimum.
References
- github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/bca1d5914fbaf3517d3b86145a802c00de4a8122 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.7 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/juev/nebula-mesh (opens in a new tab)