CVE-2026-56746: Netty · Security Control Bypass via CORS Short-Circuit Failure
Affects io.netty:netty-codec-httpSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium : upgrade to 4.2.16.Final when convenient.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 34% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.2.16.Final, 4.1.136.Final
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 22 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.2.16.Final; io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.1.136.Final.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http | Affected
| Fixed in
|
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Description
### Summary Netty's CorsHandler provides a `shortCircuit()` configuration designed to reject unauthorized cross-origin requests immediately, acting as a security control before requests reach the application. However, due to a logical operator error in the origin evaluation process, this protection can be entirely bypassed. An attacker can bypass the short-circuit mechanism by sending a request with an `Origin: null` header. This failure forwards unauthorized requests to the backend application, bypassing intended access controls. ### Details In `io.netty.handler.codec.http.cors.CorsHandler#channelRead`, the short-circuit logic relies on the configuration returned by `getForOrigin(origin)` to determine if an origin is authorized. If `getForOrigin` returns a configuration object, the short-circuit check `(!(origin == null || config != null))` is bypassed, and the request proceeds to the backend. The vulnerability is located in the `getForOrigin` method: ```java if (corsConfig.isNullOriginAllowed() || NULL_ORIGIN.equals(requestOrigin)) { return corsConfig; } ``` If an attacker sends `Origin: null`, `NULL_ORIGIN.equals(requestOrigin)` evaluates to true. The method returns the configuration object regardless of whether `isNullOriginAllowed()` was configured by the developer. The short-circuit is bypassed. ### Impact Applications relying on CorsHandler's short-circuit feature to prevent unauthorized cross-origin requests from reaching their backend logic are completely exposed. The framework fails to enforce the developer's intended access controls, allowing unauthorized requests to be processed.
References
- github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-6cqp-g7gg-8hr5 (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56746 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/netty/netty (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.136.Final (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.16.Final (opens in a new tab)