Gptline: NLTK: Missing Post-Download Integrity Verification Allows Malicious Package Injection (CVE-2026-63310)

NLTK's package downloader in nltk/downloader.py does not verify file integrity after download and before extraction. The download flow at lines 789-825: 1. File is downloaded to a temp path via HTTP 2. os.replace(tmp_filepath, filepath) moves it to the final location (line 799) 3. Extraction begins via _unzip_iter() (line 825) Between steps 2 and 3, there is no SHA-256 verification. The checksum logic exists in _pkg_status() (lines 982-1015) but it is only used BEFORE download as a status check ("is this package already installed and up-to-date?"). It is never called after download to verify the file that was actually received. Attack vectors: 1. MITM during HTTP download (NLTK downloads from http:// by default on some mirrors) 2. Race condition on shared filesystems (attacker replaces file between os.replace and _unzip_iter) 3. DNS poisoning redirecting to attacker-controlled server PoC: ```python import nltk import unittest.mock import zipfile import io import os # Create a malicious zip that will be "downloaded" malicious_zip = io.BytesIO() with zipfile.ZipFile(malicious_zip, 'w') as zf: zf.writestr('punkt_tab/tokenizers/punkt_tab/english.pickle', b'MALICIOUS PAYLOAD - attacker controlled content') # Patch urllib to return our malicious zip with unittest.mock.patch('urllib.request.urlopen') as mock_urlopen: mock_response = unittest.mock.MagicMock() mock_response.read.return_value = malicious_zip.getvalue() mock_response.headers = {'Content-Length': str(len(malicious_zip.getvalue()))} mock_urlopen.return_value = mock_response # Download proceeds, no integrity check catches the swap # nltk.download('punkt_tab') # Would install attacker payload ``` This is distinct from CVE-2024-39705 (pickle deserialization via download) and CVE-2025-14009 (zip-slip path traversal). Those address what happens AFTER extraction. This finding addresses the gap BEFORE extraction where integrity is never verified. Suggested fix: After os.replace() and before _unzip_iter(), compute SHA-256 of the final file and compare against the expected checksum from the package index. Reject and delete the file if the hash does not match.