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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-81727: NLTK · Downloader.download follows hardlinks and overwrites outside-root files

Affects acronymSource GCVE Database

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High : upgrade to 2.0.0_5 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 07:30 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.1High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2.0.0_5
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 2 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade acronym to 2.0.0_5.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Homebrewacronympkg:brew/acronymOther threatsAffected
  • >=2.0.0 <2.0.0_5
Fixed in
  • 2.0.0_5

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary NLTK's downloader now blocks symlink escapes during ZIP extraction, but it still treats pre-existing hardlinks inside the install tree as ordinary in-root files. A normal package install can therefore overwrite an outside-root inode through that hardlink. ### Details - **Vulnerability type:** Filesystem containment bypass - **Affected component:** `nltk.downloader.Downloader.download`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.incr_download` - **Affected versions:** Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced for the extraction-stage overwrite. - **Patched versions:** 3.10.3 - **Root cause:** The downloader validates traversal and symlink conditions but does not reject pre-existing hardlink aliases inside the install tree. The install flow correctly rejects a pre-existing symlink at an extraction target, yet it accepts a pre-existing hardlink at the same path. When the package is installed, extracted member data is written through the hardlink and mutates the outside inode. ### PoC **Preconditions** - The attacker can plant files inside a writable shared downloader root on the same filesystem as the target file. **Steps** 1. Prepare a downloader root and create a hardlink inside it that points to an outside target file. 2. Confirm a symlink at the same path is rejected as a negative control. 3. Run a normal `Downloader.download()` package install whose extracted member lands on the hardlink path. 4. Observe the outside target file is overwritten while the downloader still reports the package as installed. **Minimal reproducible excerpt** ```text extract_hardlink_before ORIGINAL extract_hardlink_after PWNED extract_hardlink_status installed ``` ### Impact A shared or attacker-influenced downloader directory can be turned into an overwrite primitive against same-filesystem files outside the intended install root. ### Remediation Treat pre-existing hardlinks as unsafe in extraction targets, verify that each write path stays within the intended install tree at the inode level, and add regression tests that pair hardlinks with existing symlink controls.

References

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