CVE-2026-49855: Nvchecker · tornado AsyncHTTPClient accumulates decompressed chunks without size limit (gzip bomb)
Affects nvcheckerSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 2.20_2 soon.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 07:30 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.20_2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 14 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade nvchecker to 2.20_2.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
Homebrewnvcheckerpkg:brew/nvcheckerOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
Tornado's gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set. This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response. Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.