⚠️ Open directory exposes live ISP intrusion, RADIUS subscriber creds the objective
Source Reddit ThreatIntel
Exploited in the wild · KEV due 16 Feb 2024 · public exploit available : block it and hunt for it in your logs now.
Data as of 15 Sep 2026, 05:02 UTC
- KEV deadline
- US federal agencies must patch by this date; a sensible deadline for everyone else. Other KEV due dates
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:H/RL:W/RC:CExploitation evidence
t = 0 is the CVE’s publication on cve.org
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 9 Feb 2024
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: evidence found.
CVSS exploit maturity: proof of concept public
Exploited in the wildExploited: evidence found.
Listed in CISA KEV the same day as disclosure
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
Timeline
CVE published
on cve.org
, t = 0
Added to CISA KEV (opens in a new tab)
exploitation confirmed · ransomware use known
, the same day as disclosure
In Threat Radar
record ingested
, 16 hours after disclosure
KEV remediation due
US federal deadline
, 7 days after disclosure
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), CVSS vector, CISA KEV (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| FortinetFortiOS | Affected
| Fixed in– |
| FortinetFortiProxy | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Discussion
An open directory exposed on a server in Thailand revealed an active intrusion operation targeting two major broadband providers, primarily 3BB (Triple T Broadband). The attacker exploited CVE-2024-21762 to gain remote code execution on a FortiGate 60F SSL-VPN device. The exposed files included exploitation scripts, privilege escalation tools, brute-force utilities, and a MeshCentral agent configured as a persistent backdoor. The attacker aimed to extract subscriber authentication data from RADIUS databases and had valid OpenVPN certificates and active session cookies, indicating deep network access. The attacker also prepared cleanup scripts to remove traces while maintaining persistence. Hunt.io notified affected parties and CERT prior to public disclosure.
r/threatintel (opens in a new tab)u/Straight-Practice-990 points0 comments
AttackCapture surfaced an open directory that mapped an active operation against one of Thailand's largest broadband providers and, in parallel, a second linked provider. Scope and objective are clearer than usual because the operator left the whole staging server exposed.
The tooling references internal 10.11.x.x subnets and was run from a compromised host inside the network. The objective was subscriber authentication data from the RADIUS infrastructure.
A valid OpenVPN cert from the provider's own PKI and active session cookies for the linked provider show the operation reached both companies. A second MeshCentral group referencing another organization was shared with the relevant CERT, not published.
https://hunt.io/blog/thai-broadband-fortigate-sslvpn-meshcentral-intrusion