Openclaw cli: OpenClaw Google Chat spoofing access with allowlist authorized mutable email principal despite sender-ID mismatch

Openclaw CLI's Google Chat allowlisting supports matching by sender email in addition to immutable sender resource names. This weakens identity binding if allowlists assume keys are immutable principals. The affected versions are openclaw <= 2026.2.13 and clawdbot <= 2026.1.24-3, with the specific vulnerability in 'extensions/googlechat/src/monitor.ts'. The allowFrom checks accept both immutable sender IDs and raw emails, but historically treated 'users/<email>' as an email allowlist entry, which is mutable and deprecated. Exploitation requires Google Workspace or IdP administrative control to reassign emails, making the risk low. A fix commit (c8424bf29a921e25663b29f308640b3d91a49432) addresses this by deprecating 'users/<email>' and recommending immutable user IDs for strict binding.

The vulnerability allows potential spoofing of Google Chat sender identity in allowlists that accept mutable email principals. However, exploitation requires administrative control over Google Workspace or IdP identity lifecycle, which is a high privilege level. The risk is considered low because requests are authenticated with Google Chat tokens, and attackers with such privileges typically have broader compromise capabilities.

A patch is available and should be applied. The fix deprecates the use of 'users/<email>' as an email allowlist entry and treats it as a user ID instead. Documentation now recommends using immutable user IDs ('users/<id>') for strict identity binding. Raw email allowlists remain supported for usability. Users should upgrade to versions >= 2026.2.14 where this behavior is corrected.